

Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind and Cognition

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Lecture No. # 09

Dualism – III

Let us resume our discussion on Dualism, as you all know that, Descartes is advocating the substance dualism. And in the last class I mentioned that, we will be discussing the criticism of Ryle and John Searle, with reference to Descartes substance dualism. We had briefly discussed about Gilbert Wright's criticism, that is how Descartes commits category mistake. Descartes is being debated and discussed for last probably more than 400 years now and the problem of dualism is becoming perennial problem in philosophy of mind.

Now, how does Descartes commit category mistake? Descartes commits this category mistake, because Descartes puts mind and the body into two different frame works and for him they are categorically distinct from each other. Now, this is was not acceptable to many and Ryle understanding the difficulties that Descartes is a committee points out that, this is a category mistake.

Now, category mistakes becomes a problematic one, because Descartes does not see the interaction between the mind and the body, and this interaction has to be a logical interaction. This interaction is not to be you know governed by the existence of god or any other mystical power. So, therefore, Ryle points out that mind has to be located in the body and has to be exhibited in our voluntary actions; mind is not a mystical entity, mind is something that is shown in our everyday activities.

Nothing hidden, as I mentioned that one of the questions was about, is there is something hidden. Ryle was certainly referring to the foreordain notion of a mind, which says that there is a subconscious mind. And this subconscious mind is not given to our consciousness and that it remains, you know an important category for (O), because the subconscious minds sometimes can control and the conscious mind and the subconscious

mind perform voluntary actions, which are known to the conscious mind, you know there are many a movies sort in this particular problem of foreordain unconsciousness.

Now, let us do not go in to that right now, probably will come back to this little later in our lecture, what is the significance of foreordain consciousness. But today, we are going to resume our discussion on the problem of dualism, precisely giving two things in our mind, one is whether Ryle criticism against Descartes is little problematic, and how far it is acceptable to others, and second one is as I mentioned earlier, that will be also discussing about Searle's criticism to Descartes concept of mind, does dualism reveal, is a question mark, and with all this criticisms, let us look at the difficulties that a Ryle commits.

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Observations on the Criticisms of Ryle

- Albert Hofstadter, "Ryle's Category Mistake" *Journal of Philosophy*, vol.48, No. 9, 1951.
- 1. **The Concept of mind** is a brilliant attack on **Mentalism** in general and dualism in particular
- 2. Dualism is not a **factual mistake but a logical mistake**. This shown undertaking the study of **the logic of language**
- **Ryle's analysis implies 'only a certain sort of sophisticated naïve behaviourism**

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Now, Hofstadter in one of his paper Ryle on category mistake writes, I would summarize the kind of problem, I find there are three important problem Hofstadter is mentioning, one is that, Ryle is making a brilliant attack on mentalism in general and dualism in particular. And second one is, dualism is not a factual mistake for Ryle, it is a logical mistakes, and the logical mistake is based on the problem of the study of logic of language.

As you know, during that time MacDonald points out in one of his paper and all this paper published in 1951, after Ryle's work the famous work, the concept of mind and many of them were discussing about Descartes problem, and they were as higher Gilbert

Beilstein and many others. And Ryle probably saving their ideas with us, but this piece of work, the concept of mind is a classic to the philosophical community who is working in philosophy of mind.

Now, Ryle says that it is, there is something problematic about the logic of language, this way the language is been used and another problem which Hofstadter finds is that, it Ryle is committing to a some kind of a sophisticated naive behaviorism. Now, is it true that Ryle is committing to that kind of behaviorism, what is behaviorism? That will be discussing little later.

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Hofstadter's Disagreement 1

- **“How are the mental conduct concepts applicable to human behaviour? Is a question about the causation of behaviour.”**
– (Ryle 1950: 67)

- **What makes the bodily movement voluntary? Is a causal question.**

 (Hofstadter 1951)

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So, keeping all these three points in mind, let us look at what makes the bodily movement a voluntary one is a casual question for Hofstadter and that is one important question which I was discussing yesterday. And this is one of the first **you know** disagreement with Ryle; Ryle says that how are the mental concepts applicable to human behavior, is a question about causation of behavior.

This is something very significant, when we talk about how do we perform voluntary actions? Is this voluntary actions are consciously performed or they are intentional, so on and so forth. Now, all intentional actions are conscious actions, all intentional actions are subject to moral evaluation, whether being as a moral one must talk about or must say that, whether this action is good or bad, right or wrong, this is how we evaluate, this is how we reflect on our actions.

Now, Hofstadter points out, that if somebody is performing an action, if somebody is behaving in a particular way, now these behaviors are certainly caused by something. Now, what is the cause of this action? One of the disagreements of Hofstadter with a Ryle, the other one is, is it the behavior which is caused by the body and not by some kind of a nonmaterial agency or the self, Descartes discusses, now if it is caused by the body and what is the causal principle.

Now, according to Ryle, there are dispositions and sub dispositions, which can manifest in to actions, so body has certain dispositional capacities and this dispositional capacities cause action, cause behavior. Now, the Ryle therefore, according to Hofstadter is committing to some kind of a naives behaviorism.

Now, behaviorism is a materialistic theory of mind, there are other materialistic theory of mind, which will be discussing in the next class, say for example, functionalism is one of the **you know** materialistic schools of thought. So, let us think, how does Ryle **(())** overcome this issues, probably for Ryle as we talked about the second point, that Ryle was only talking about some kind of a analysis or Ryle was giving to us some kind of analysis of the kind of concepts, which were used by Descartes; so that was something interesting, Ryle is not a behaviorist in the way we understand behaviorism. So, Ryle is not eliminating the concept of mind, Ryle is not reducing the concept of mind.

Now, the question is, is Ryle giving an explanation of the concept of mind or he is just describing the mental phenomena say for example, evolution, emotion, feeling are all these concepts are dealt separately in different steps in the particular classic called the concept of mind.

Now, where Ryle gives an elaborate analysis of this **this** concepts, now there is a distinction between philosophical explanation and the scientific explanation, philosophical explanation is a kind of a description, where as scientific explanation is some kind of a causal explanation; as **you know** science follows, the principle of causality and tries to find out, what is the cause of a particular event, if the event is occurring in the world, then what is the cause of it.

For Hofstadter, the question was whether Ryle is looking for the cause, the way scientist are looking for the cause of mind or he is just giving an analysis and the analysis is based on the logic of the language. Now, if that is true, then this kind of **you know** questions,

which Hofstadter is making that, what makes the bodily movement voluntary is a causal question. Because, look at the last a sentence in Ryle's is a question about the causation of behavior, so that was no point which Ryle is talking about and that can be translated as, this what makes the bodily movements, movement of voluntary.

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Disagreement 2

- **Descartes not be blamed for advocating dualism.**
Historically dualism has been advocated by Stoics, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, et. al.



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Now, the second disagreement which Hofstadter is having is that Descartes is not to be blamed for advocating dualism, because historically if you look at the concept of dualism, it has been advocated by the stoics, it has been advocated by Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine and many others. So, dualism is not an issue only with the Descartes, Descartes is only trying to show us that, how mind cannot be explained within the framework of a mechanistic world, mechanistic world if you, which is given by the science. And how can we talk about the mind with certainty that, there exist something and that is a real one, how can we talk about such a self evident truth that mind exist.

So, Descartes and dual is something very significant in that direction, if somebody tries to read Descartes from this point of view, I am sure that he would try to find out, how Descartes philosophical presuppositions are based on these epistemological concepts as we mention certainty, clarity, distinctness and self-evidence. So, all these if something is real, then they must fulfill all these characteristics, and that will be **you know**, that will give some kind of authenticities.

So, but Ryle questions the authenticities of Descartes, because Ryle finds that, this is some kind of a privileged access, it the self is only privileged to have this access to the mind. So, the privileged access thesis talks about that only an individual is having this **you know** access to its private mind and it is not accessible through the other, meaning there by others would not know my mind, it is of course true that I am aware of my own thoughts, as all of you are aware of your thoughts.

So, and it is true that, we look at mind from our own point of view, is something very important, will come back to that. But, what is important here is to note, that dualism is not a problem with Descartes, rather dualism is been advocated and Descartes is not to be blamed for this that he is making a kind of a category mistake.

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How do we explain action?

- **Philosophical explanation is descriptive rather than explanatory.**
- **How can teleological behaviour be explained with the assumption that the nervous system function like a cybernatic mechanism? And to explain this mechanism we need anatomical and physiological evidences.**
 - **This would of course weaken the position of dualism.**



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So, that was Hofstadter point, say let us see how do we explain actions? So, philosophical explanation as I pointed out earlier, that it is descriptive rather than explanatory. Because, when we talk about human actions, when we talk about voluntary actions, now all these voluntary actions are having some kind of a purpose. Now, if they are teleological, and therefore, they cannot be explained only with reference to the kind of the nervous systems function like a cybernatic mechanism.

So, they cannot be explained only with reference to the physiology of the body, the physiological function of the body, the physiological function is **alright** say we do accept

that, there are physiological functions which goes in (()) with our thoughts. So, there is a kind of a harmony between the activities of the body and the mental activities.

So, that harmony is not ruled out, but what is important is this that, most of the time when we talk about scientific explanations of the mind, we refer to the cybernetic mechanism or the mechanism that are there with reference to the anatomy, human anatomy or physiology. And they give evidences and science grows with evidence, because evidence will show us how it can be proved, how it can be proved that this is what is happening.

So, scientific analyses are mostly demonstrative as you know it can be viewed from a third persons point of view, so demonstrative attitude of science it is explicitly present in Ryle. So, therefore, Ryle is trying to give an explanatory account, rather than giving a kind of a descriptive account of the philosophy of mind. Now, what is descriptive, and why description holds sound on what context description holds sound, is to be seen.

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Ryle's philosophical Analysis

- **Defining the mental substance as observable facts**
- **All observable facts are explained with the help of a theory**
- **But mind is not an observable facts**
- **Hence, it is not part of the explanatory theory, rather it is descriptive.**



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Now, most of the cases when we talk about mind is not an observable phenomenon, it is not observable facts, all observable facts are explained with the help of a theory, science talks about a theory, which explains the phenomenon; if mind is an unobservable fact, then certainly we cannot have an explanation of mind in the frame work of science.

So, therefore, we need to talk about a descriptive theory, probably will help us to talk about mind, so that is something very interesting. So, that science deals with explanation where as philosophical explanations are different from scientific explanations and you all know Wittgenstein's famous statement; that philosophy is not science, philosophy is either, neither above or below science.

So, the very fact that philosophy is not to be identified science, so philosophical enterprise is something different, it is something unique and for Wittgenstein say philosophical explanations are **are** to be descriptive, because when we talk about scientific explanation, if we accept scientific explanation a something true and it is fundamental. So, for us truth is concerned, then probably we will not see the significance of unobservable phenomenon like the mind, so human mind is an unobservable fact, it is an experiential fact will be eliminated, **will be** will not be discussed as it has been discussed in philosophical theories.

So, scientific theory eliminates probably the concept of mind, so there is a danger in looking for a scientific explanation of the philosophical mind. So, philosophy has to differentiated self, the way it studies its own phenomenon, now why there will be mind, as I said when we talk about voluntary actions.

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What is man? And, Why dualism?

- **“Man exhibits certain characteristics in behaviour; a complex persistence in variation, teleological unity, multiple tracked dispositions and so on, whereas stones do not.”**
- **“Men are something more than the bodily, having something competent, as body is not, to make body behave intelligently. This is soul. (It is like pilot in the ship; without the pilot the ship wonders aimlessly)” (Hofstadter 1951: 264)**



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When we perform voluntary actions, we do perform it with this idea that there is something called a self or there is something called an accent, who is **you know** directing

us and this direction with a purpose, so there is a purpose in our actions, so and that is why it is called voluntary actions. Look at now the way Hofstadter defines the concept of man, what is man he says, and why this dualism? I could Hofstadter, man exhibits certain characteristics in behavior; a complex persistence in variation, teleological unit, multiple tracked dispositions and so on, where as stones do not, that is why a human being is different from the other objects, other things in the world, other material bodies and look at the next quotation.

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Men are something more than the bodily, having something competent as body is not, to make body behave intelligently, and this is soul. Now, what makes the body to behave intelligently is something interesting, so there we can talk about, we can presuppose, that there is somebody or there is something called soul or there is something called mind which is directing us, and that is not to be explained.

Now, of when we talk about, how there are multiple dispositions and the complexity of human body mechanisms, that is not the issue, rather how things are planned, and how things are executed and so on so forth. How do we imagine about the reality, all these are important, how do we rationalize our actions and how do we justify our selves, now that is something interesting. That gives us a clue to understand this presuppositions, that there is something called mind and that is real and Hofstadter says that it is like pilot in the ship parenthesis, without the pilot the ship wonders aimlessly. Hofstadter mentions this lines, this sounds like totally a (O), because there is an end to life and human actions are directed towards that.

So, there is a goal, there is a purpose and this purposes makes **you know** our actions teleological, there is a delouse, there is a purpose in performing an action. So, now, let us go back to Searle's criticism against Descartes; now, so with this we, I will conclude Ryle's criticism, that even if we talk about mind-body dualism, we find that dualism is a kind of a problem that would go on in philosophical discourse. Because, looking at the Searle's criticism, Searle is raising this in his famous eighth lecture series on mind-body problem the title of the book which was published in 1984 minds, brains and science by Harvard university phrase.

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Searle on Mind and Body Problem

- Why Dualism still remains?
- The **commonsensical pictures** of man as **conscious, free, mindful, rational** agents does not go with the **scientific conception** of the reality. i.e.
 - the world contains nothing but the unconscious physical particles.
 - **How does one balance these problems?**



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I refer to Searle's this particular text and the first chapter of this text tells us, the mind and body problem, why dualism still remains? Is a fundamental questions, because looking at Hofstadter's and many others, we will find that mind is not something to be eliminated easily, as it is probably mind is a substance is not acceptable to many others. And, but what kind of dualism, Searle thinks that it is inevitable in the discourse of philosophy of mind.

So, therefore, Searle finds that there are two things which are incompatible, and probably that is something very problematic for Searle; one there is a commonsensical picture and the picture is, that man is conscious is free, mindful, rational, agents and the other one is that there is a scientific conception of the world, that everything in the world is constituted of certain material or physical particles.

So, therefore, we encounter the problem of dualism, because on the one hand, we find that there is a world and the world is constituted of certain material bodies, the finest molecules, particles etcetera **etcetera**, carbons etcetera **etcetera**, the other hand you have mind and which is treated as a **as a** conscious one which is free etcetera **etcetera**. Now, there is some kind of incompatibility between two, and how do we can eliminate this difficulties?

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Searle's basic questions

- **How human beings represent the world?**
- **How essentially meaningless world contains meanings?**



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How can we make this, there is some compatibility there mind-body relations? Now, Searle's is raising two important questions in this context, one is how human beings represent the world, a something very significant, how essentially meaningless world contains meaning? Now, these two questions I think are very important to talk about the concept of mind, because in Ryle's discussion we found that dualism is treated; we found that mentalism is also treated and most of the scientific analyses of the **the** concept of mind or the scientific explanation of the concept of mind.

After 1950's onwards the kind of literature which are been produced, mostly are inclined to development that are happening in science. Now, their inclination is probably acceptable, I mean need to respect the scientific endeavor which is very productive, **productive** because we are finding more **and more** evidences with reference to our know actions and with reference to our mind perceive. So, the investigating that is carried out by science is certainly a fruitful exercise, no doubt about it.

We have advanced in the direction of neurophysiology, neurobiology, psychology, artificial intelligence, etcetera **etcetera**. Now there are so many disciplines in science which are studying the concept of mind, what is human mind and how human mind can be explained in scientific terms. So, that is that is of course, is to be discussed and people are debating on this issue.

But, what is important is whether there is a mind at all, Searle's first question talks about that, how human beings represent the world, it is through human beings the world is being represented. So, it is through mind in other words, it is through that the mind world is being represented and Descartes was probably emphasizing on this that there is representational mind, and look at his idea of clarity and distinctness.

And, Descartes mentions that if language enters hints, then the representation becomes a some kind of an unclear one. So, I mean this is particularly with reference to how do we know our mind, so the moment I bring language, the moment I try to express myself, there is some kind of a **know** gap found, but when I try to know myself there is no such gap. So, that kind of **know** thing is advocated with the mentalist, mentalist finds that mind is real and mind represents the world.

And the other question, which is important how essentially meaningless world contains meanings, which is if the world is constituted of material particles, then there is no meaning exist in this particles; there will be meaning if and only if there is a meaner, there is a knower it is the existence of the knower which will talk about meaning. So, meaning is **meaning** with reference to the existence of a person who means it is, so there is a some kind of an epistemological concern John Searle here, that Searle is not only talking about the ontology of the mind, because unless the mind is real it cannot represent the world.

The other one is that, there is a kind of an epistemological significance associated with this semantic enterprise, which Searle is looking for; that without the knower knowledge about the world is impossible, in other words without knower the existence of world is meaningless. So, all this meaning that we talk about it with reference to human society, with reference to human life as a whole, it is nothing to do with a the world in itself.

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Spill over of this issue

- **“How should we interpret recent work in computer science and artificial intelligence - work aimed at making intelligent machines?”**
- **Does digital computer give us right picture of the human mind?”**
– (Searle 1984: 13)



Now there is of course, Searle says this discussion has some kind of a spill over effects. So, people have tried to look at human mind from the perspective of computer science or artificial intelligence.

Now, people have really taken the question seriously, is mind a machine is a question. Do we think like machines or there is a ghost in the machine, what we say that there is a little man in the brain which is thinking. So, this kind of a debate, is something very interesting and we will be definitely talking about it, in our future classes.

So, Searle says does digital computer give us right picture of the human mind, is a question, because of most of the cases when we find that mind is been studied from the prospective of artificial intelligence, and the cognitive science claims this, that mind is like a digital machine.

And, the way digital machine operates, mind operates in a similar way; and we will be discussing about it particularly professor Nath will be dealing extensively on this issue, when he talks about why computer cannot think and what kind of creativity computers will have, and what kind of creativity computers cannot have, are probably may not have you know the way, we have seen computers.

Now, coming back to Searle's discussion on dualism, Searle says mind-body dualism has something to do with a kind of a stomach digestion problem. So, mind-body problem is

like **like** a stomach digestion problem, now when we talk about stomach, when you say that foods are digested in the stomach; now digested through a particular biological process.

So, similarly mind is a reality to us, because there is a brain, so mind-body problem for Searle is not mind-body problem, whether mind-brain problem; and that is an analogous to stomach digestion problem, the way brain processes thinks it gives birth to consciousness, so consciousness is in fact, caused by the brain processes.

So, that is why Searle's says it is a mind-brain issue, so mind-brain problem; and the other problem that he finds problematic is this that in Descartes, we are now finding a different kind of vocabulary. Descartes and the critics of Descartes are concerned with some kind of categories like either you are monist or a dualist, either you are a materialist or a mentalist, if you are a materialist then either you are a behaviorist or you **you know you** are a physicalist or you are a functionalist.

Now, this kind of categories, the way the philosophers have **you know have** explained mind with the help of this categories are to be abandoned, are to be **you know** rejected, because those categories create **you know** enormous problem to us and therefore, we do not see mind as it is, and it is for that mind-brain problem still remains a kind of an interesting philosophical problem to us.

Now, once we start knowing about, how the brain processes, cause mind probably we do not have the difficulties in understanding the concept of mind. So, Descartes is certainly concerned with the existence of mind, now the question is whether Searle is concerned with the mind?

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Searle's basic questions

- **How human beings represent the world?**
- **How essentially meaningless world contains meanings?**



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As I mentioned about these two questions, before that **you know** how mind human beings represent the world, now certainly Searle is not eliminating ontology of mind; Searle is also not avoiding the epistemological issue that is embedded in discourse of mind.

What is Searle's interest here? Searle is raising a different problem and the problems are very important, because there is an enormous development is happened in the scientific understanding of mind, and scientific understanding of mind gives a materialistic picture of mind and that picture is like this.

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Temptation to downgrade the mental

- **Materialism**
- Subjective, conscious mental states are **not real** and **reducible** to any thing else in the universe.
 - Imagining non existence of consciousness is meaningless.
- “Consciousness is the central fact of specifically human aspects of our existence – language, love, humour, and so on – would be impossible.”



(Searle 1984: 16)

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So, there is subjective, conscious mental states are not real in fact there reducible to anything else in the universe quote (O) they can be reducible to and this reduction is a casual reduction, and there are several kinds of reduction, Searle talks about it in his work the rediscovery of mind will come back to those criticism of Searle’s against materialism. But, Searle says materialism somehow rejected the motion of mind is undermined the existence of mind, and that is what is not acceptable.

Whether for Searle is a quote, “consciousness is the central fact of specifically human aspects of our existence-language, love, humour and so on-would be impossible”. And quote without consciousness, so without consciousness all our human aspects of life is really meaningless and that gives a clue, how to talk about the ontology of mind, so that is something very problematic. So, as I mentioned earlier that Searle’s says there are four things we need to talk about, because these four things are important to us and they are consciousness, intentionality, subjectivity and mental causation.

Now, all four things are problematic and their need to be given proper scientific **you know** account and there need to be explained a way by the materialist. So, as I mentioned earlier, that mind is caused by brain processes or consciousness is caused by brain processes and Searle’s famous hypothesis is this that mind is caused by brain processes and realized in brain processes.

So, Searle says it is the brain processes, which causes mind or consciousness and again these conscious mental states which are caused by brain processes or realized in the brain processes. So, there is a kind of a **know** casual connection Searle is talking about, when he talks about mind and body relationship, now this casual connection is certainly different from the kind of casual connection which other emergent's are talking about.

We will have know exclusive discussion on the problem of emergent's, when we will discuss the famous emergent's is Jaegwon Kim and Searle, how to they differ the Searle agree with emergent's notion of mind or his notion of mind is something different that will see **know** in different context. But, for today let us accept this proposition of Searle that mind is caused by brain processes and that is how consciousness is being caused and consciousness includes all kinds of **you know** mental states conscious or unconscious, now all these mental states are intrinsically intentional.

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Problem with Intentionality

- How can this stuff inside my head is **about** anything?
- How can it **refer** to anything?
- How does the mind **represent** the world?



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Mental states like believe, desire, hope etcetera, are intentional mental states and now there intentional because, consciousness has this property called intentionality and intentionality is intrinsically associated with consciousness. And otherwise, how can we say that the mind is about anything, how does the mind represents the things, now this about nests or offense is nothing but, to talk about the intentionality of the mind, because certainly the brain the stuff inside my head is not representing things directly, they did

not really mean what they represent, they are just a kind of a facilitating the representation.

So, the second question, look at the second question how can it refer to anything, how can the brain refer to anything? So, there is certainly something, that is consciousness and it is that conscious mind which makes referential claims and that reference happens if and only if there is intentionality intrinsic to the mind, so therefore, it is the mind which represents the world. So, Searle is talking about intentionality is famous work, intentionality is published in Cambridge university in 1983 is something very important text on philosophy of mind, and that is one of the original text of John Searle now, there the title of the text is intentionality an essay in philosophy of mind.

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Problem of subjectivity

- 'I have pain' – *from my point of view.*
- I am aware of myself and *my internal mental states* which are quite different from the mental states of the other people.



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Look at the next problem that Searle is talking about, Searle says it is not the problem of intentionality alone intentionality gives birth to another problem that is subjectivity. So, human mental states are subjective, their subjectively associated with mind or our self, so for example, when I say I have pain I look at this sensation from my own point of view, **when I say that I have pain I am looking at my own point of view.** So, all the feelings sensations and experiences that we are having all the mental states that we are having are looked at from the subjects point of view and that constitutes the subjectivity.

So, subjectivity is an epistemic category for Searle, will come back to that how Searle talks about ontology and epistemology of the mind later in our discussion on when we

talk about the structure of mental states or structure of mind. But, the very fact that I am aware of myself, my intentional mental state is internal to me are different from the mental states of yours or the mental states of others, people is something very significant.

He says those mental states are subjective, they are part of my consciousness and similarly, your conscious states and your intentional mental states are could be seen from your own point of view. So, there is some kind of subjectivity, which is associated with the problem of consciousness the problem of mind and that cannot be eliminated and the other problem which Searle is talking about is the mental position.

Searle says, there is bodily activity say for example, look at will Einstein famous statement, the hand is moving upward and I raise my hand **know**, the second statement I raise my hand is a kind of a voluntary action, and the reason for making the statement is that I intend to raise my hand up by doing this by performing this action, I am giving or I am generating a kind of a meaning to my action. But, when I say that hand is moving up probably I am not voluntarily doing that, I am not voluntarily performing the action, think of myself lying on the bed and I am conscious of it that hand is going up and down, but I have no control of it.

So, bodily actions, bodily movements are performed their without having any control over it, digestion is performed without my control over it, so digestion palpitations are not voluntary actions there by biological actions, so of human organism. So, now similarly, brain processes happening it is natural biological fact that brain processes will produce some amount of consciousness, some amount of mental states, so brain processes do cause mental states.

And Searle say, when we talk about voluntary actions, we explain or voluntary actions with reference to a particular mental state or with reference to collection of mental states, so that is the reason for my action. So, my action is intentional and they can be an intentional casual explanation of this voluntary actions that my hand is going up, and whereas, the bodily movements are the existence of my body is possible, because there is a gravitational force operating around me; that is making my **you know** in this possibility is that, I can sit on the chair and I will not fly in the sky. So, I am not going my body will not go up, so there is a certainly gravitational force operating me.

So, Searle is saying that, there is a world and the world has a casual influence on the material body, and there is also a world called mind, which is the part of the world, and that is causing voluntary reactions. So, when he talks about meaning, when he talks about representation, it is at the second world of course, Searle does not speak in terms of this world.

Searle does not say that there is a first world, second world or third world, but it is for our understanding I am making this statement that **it is the mind** it is the mind that we make representations; and mind has a special role to play when it comes to our semantic activities, when it comes to our knowledge forming capacities, when it comes to our building up institutions etcetera.

So, Searle is talking about in the language of 21st century, Searle is of course not really talking the way the Descartes thoughts in 17th century. So, one of the problems that Searle says, that let us do not talk about those categories of dualism, monism, populism etcetera **etcetera**. Let us talk about the kind of reality which we are encountered, I think Searle's criticism against Descartes is something very significant in this context.

Searle is not eliminating dualism, Searle probably does not believing those kind of a categories, but Searle is interested in this question, and many people have questioned Searle that, Searle is committing a kind of a property dualism will see that in our next classes.

But with this, I would like to conclude that, how Ryle criticism is significant in the direction of understanding the concept of mind and how Searle's criticism makes a fruitful exercise in analyzing the problem of mind, thank you.