

## Contemporary Issues In Philosophy Of Mind And Cognition

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
Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay

Lecture No. # 42

**Creativity: Human Vs Machine-II**


In the last class, as we have seen that I was explaining about consciousness and creativity. I was explaining in respect to creativity, a human, and machines and how can we ascribe creativity to machines and is there any machine creativity or not. In order to prove that whether machine said creativity or not. We have to discuss about the consciousness and creativity. But in this second lectures on creativity: human verses machines deals with the problem of the relationship between the creativity and consciousness. There are many philosophical problems which can be read in this connection.

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**Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition**

- What is consciousness?
- What role, if any, does consciousness play in the explanation of creativity?
- All we know about consciousness that it is a phenomena which cannot be measured, observed or experienced in public, because it is a subjective experience. It can be known only from a first-person perspective, but not from the third person/scientific/objective perspective. Because self is the subject, which feels, thinks and perceive. This is the qualitative character of human experience.

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
What is consciousness? What role, if any, does consciousness play in the explanation of creativity? Here I am not arguing whether machines or robots have consciousness or creativity, which we have already discussed in the last sections. But in this section, I

want to show how consciousness and creativity goes together and what role consciousness has in a creative act. Philosophers have treated consciousness as a mystery for a long time. In the recent years, researches from diverse fields like psychology, neuroscience, computer science, physics, etcetera are showing interest in the subject and are coming forward to share their findings with others.

Consciousness is very much related to the creative activities because a human being cannot be creative without being conscious. This does not mean that a man who is conscious is necessarily creative, but consciousness is an essential feature of the human mind. If consciousness truly is such an essential feature of our mind, then the question is: is it? Definitely, there are no universal accepted answers to this question. We are still in search of a true theory of consciousness.

All we know about consciousness is that it is a phenomena which cannot be measured, or observed or experienced in public, because it is a subjective experience as we have seen. It can be known only from a first-person perspective, but not from the third person or scientific or objective perspective. Because the self is the subject, which feels, thinks and perceives. This is the qualitative character of the human experience.


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Thomas Nagel, one of the profounder of this thesis on consciousness. He says that, “an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism- something it is like for the organism. We may call this the subjective character

of experience”. All experiences therefore, are essentially subjective. As Searle has argued, subjective is the **is the** most important feature of the conscious mental state and processes. According to him, the conscious mental states do not have objective criteria and so are essential third-person experiences. For him, subjectivity is an ontological category.


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Searle puts it in this way, “when we realize either the world with this inner eye, we cannot see consciousness. Indeed, it is the very subjectivity of consciousness that makes it visible in the crucial way. If we try to draw a picture of someone else’s consciousness, we just end up drawing the other peoples (perhaps with a balloon growing out of his or her head). If we try to draw our own consciousness, we end up drawing whatever it is that we are conscious of”.


According to Searle, for the first-person phenomena of consciousness is irreducible and so cannot be explained objectively, it cannot be observed the way objective phenomena are observed. He comes to this conclusion by the following reasoning that the notion of observation of seeing something, works on the presupposition that there is a distinction between the things in and the things seeing of it. But for observation, there is simply no way to make this separation. Any introduction, we have of our own conscious state is itself that conscious states.

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- Now we have to explore, what role, if any, does consciousness play in the explanation of creativity?
- In a general sense all conscious beings are creative, because creativity is a feature of consciousness. We human beings, manifest or show our creativity in our day-to-day life.
- For example, writing poems, musical compositions, scientific theories, painting, and many other things are creative acts. This also shows that creativity is an essential feature of mind or consciousness, because creativity presupposes that the creative being is conscious

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Now we have to explore, what role, if any, does consciousness play in the explanation of creativity? In general sense all conscious beings are creative, because creativity is a feature of consciousness. We, human beings, manifest or show our creativity in our day-to-day life. For example, writing a poems, musical compositions, scientific theories, painting, and many other things are creative acts. This also shows that creativity is an essential feature of mind or consciousness, because creativity presupposes that the creative being is conscious.

There are many creative ideas which have followed from human consciousness. For example, creating computer or robots is an unexpected use of everyday objects that could have happened before. These machines have been created by creative minds. They themselves cannot be creative, because they lack consciousness. Creativity is itself mystery whose cannot be scientifically explained.


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As Boden writes, “Creativity is puzzle, a paradox, some say a mystery. Inventors, scientists, and artist rarely know how their original ideas arise. They maintain intuition, but cannot say how it works.”

Boden, Margaret A., *Dimensions of Creativity*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1996.

Creativity is due to human ‘intuition’, which is beyond the scope of scientific investigation. Thus intuition is itself a creative process beyond the realm of scientific investigation.



As Boden writes, “creativity is puzzle, a paradox, some says a mystery. Inventors, scientists, and artists rarely know how their original ideas arise. They maintain intuition, but cannot say how it works”. Creativity is due to human ‘intuition’, which is beyond the scope of scientific investigation. Thus intuition is itself a creative process beyond the realm of scientific investigations. And as we have already discussed, there are two kinds of creativity: psychological creativity or P-creativity and historical creativity or H-creativity and there are some important features on creativity that I am not going to repeat here. But I am going to explain in an aspect to, in comparison to, human creativity and human consciousness.


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## Machine-Consciousness and Creative is Derivative

The key words here are “machine”, “creativity and “consciousness”. Now, it is entirely possible that the meaning of these words may change; consequently the statements involving them may no longer stand in the same logical relation to other statements as they do now. This may occur for a variety of reasons.

However, moving beyond the reasons for the time being, it can be asked whether it is possible for a machine to be self-conscious?

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Now, we have to see machine-consciousness and creativity is derivative. How the machine consciousness and creativity is derivative? The key words here are “machine”, “consciousness”, and “creativity”. Now, it is entirely possible that the meaning of these words may change consequently the statement involving them may no longer stand in the same logical relation to the other statement as they do now. This may occur for a variety of reasons. However, moving beyond the reasons for the time being, it can be asked whether it is possible for a machine to do self-conscious?

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The usual answer is “No”. Wittgenstein makes the following remark while answering this question in his *‘Philosophical Investigations’*; “. . . only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say it has sensations; its sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious.”

Again, he remarks, “we do indeed say of an inanimate thing that is in pain: when playing with dolls for example. But this use of the concept of pain is a secondary one. Imagine a case in which people ascribed pain only to inanimate things; pitied only dolls.”


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Wittgenstein, L., *Philosophical Investigations* (Trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe), Basil Blackwell Ltd., Oxford, 1976.

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Again he remarks, “We do indeed say of an inanimate thing that is in pain: when playing with dolls for example. But this use of the concept of pain is a secondary one. Imagine a case in which people ascribed pain only to inanimate things; pitied only to dolls”. Thus only of what behaves like a living things? Can we say that it is conscious? This claim connects consciousness with life, but not with what constitute life rather than with what manifest or express it. A living thing might therefore, in principle qualify for the ascription of consciousness. So long as it behaves like a living conscious thing. We are so prone to count the robots of science, fiction films as conscious beings, because though they are not alive they act as if they are **as if they are**. We cannot make a conscious stone because the stone does not behave in a way we recognize as experience of its supposed consciousness; however, it may be claimed by some that machine can examine their own mechanism.

Artificial intelligence programs: for example, suggest that their program have inbuilt mechanism to examine their own mechanisms. For examples, as we have seen in the movie on I robot and Spiderman 2 and many other movies, which are based on artificial intelligence and there we will find some kind of self mechanisms in the robot and that shows that the self mechanism is sufficient to explain the self consciousness, according to artificial intelligence scientist or machine intelligent scientist. The field of machine intelligence diverted in large measure to the goal of reproducing mentality in computer science machine. So far as the program has been a limited, but supporters argue that they have everything to believe that eventual computers will tool have minds.

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It is easy to say machines have consciousness because it is logically possible to design and build computer-based machines that are intelligent and can read meaning in symbols.

This is to say that intelligence is not necessarily embodied in living organisms, but may occur in a computer system based on silicon.

One of the important 'strong' claims is that any physical system that is capable of carrying out the necessary processes can be meaningfully intelligent.

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It is easy to say that machines have consciousness because it is logically possible to design and build computer-based machines that are intelligent and can read meaning in symbols. This is to say that intelligence is not necessarily embodied in living organisms, but may occur in a computer system based on silicon. One of the important 'strong' claims is that any physical system that is capable of carrying out the necessary processes can be meaningfully intelligent. Hence, it is very easy to say that a machine has intelligence because it performs important tasks like life, human beings. It is a hard to believe that machine is conscious, because there is no conscious effort in machines that is there is no subjective experience of machines.




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Now we face the question: Is it possible that unintelligent machines could give rise to an intelligent conscious experience?

Consciousness is defined as the having of the perception of thought, feeling, and awareness. It is the basic presupposition of all that we do in our waking life. It is something we know directly. From this point of view, the machines are not conscious the way human beings are.

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Now, we have to face the questions: Is it possible that unintelligent machines could give rise to an intelligent conscious experience? Consciousness is defined as the having of the perception of thought, feeling, and awareness. It is the basic presupposition of all that we do in our waking life. It is something we know directly. From this point of view, the machines are not conscious the way human beings are.

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David Chalmers claims that there is, “the subjective quality of experience.”

Consciousness has subjective quality because the subjective experience is a mental state. It is ‘I’, who feels. The ‘I’ poses the central problem relating to consciousness. The ‘I’ is not a part of the body, but it is more than body. This is to say that the ‘I’ is distinct from the body. This qualitative feature ‘I’ is treated as the subjectivity of consciousness. That’s why consciousness is defined in terms of qualitative feel of experience or qualia.

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As David Chalmers claims, the one of the founder of non-mechanistic concept of mind in its book on the conscious mind, he has explained we have to this that, “the subjective

quality of the consciousness is something the subjective quality of experience". He says that a consciousness has subjective quality of experience. Consciousness has subjective quality because the subjective experience is a mental state. It is 'I', who feels. The 'I' poses the central problem relating to consciousness. The 'I' is not a part of the body, but it is more than the body. This is to say that the 'I' is distinct from the body. This qualitative feature 'I' is treated as the subjectivity of consciousness. That is why consciousness is defined in terms of qualitative feel of experience or qualia and on which we have already explained, but I will be discuss in relation to creativity.

Furthermore, as we have already seen, consciousness stands for an internal aspect. Since, that is something it is feels to be like a cognitive agent. This internal aspect is conscious experiences. We know perfectly while that we are conscious of things around us including other people, what we do not grasp consciousness itself; however, it is this common features, consciousness, which may be said to be the central element in the concept of mind.


The distinction between conscious and unconscious things, the facts that we cannot draw a line between the unconscious and the conscious is similar to the fact that cannot draw a line in the spectrum, where blue ends and green begins. That we cannot draw a dividing line does not mean that there is no difference between the two extreme ends. It is the central issue in philosophy to draw the dividing line between the conscious and the unconscious. Therefore, philosophy of mind is concerned with all mental phenomena, where mental phenomena are to be understood us, all phenomena that involves consciousness.

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Intentionality is a unique characteristic of the mental phenomena. This is because our consciousness is always consciousness of something.

As Searle puts it, "Intentionality is that feature of certain mental states and events that consists in their (in special sense of these words) being directed at, being about, being of, or representing certain other entities and states of affairs."

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Searle, John R., *Consciousness and Language*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002


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Searle shows that all our conscious experiences are not intentional in the sense that there may be conscious experiences, which are not about anything to particular.

Searle writes, "Beliefs, fears, hopes, and desires are Intentional; but there are forms of nervousness, elation, and undirected anxiety that are not Intention."

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
Searle, John R., *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983.

Searle shows that all our conscious experiences are not intentional in the sense that there may be conscious experiences, which are not about anything to particular. Searle writes,

“Beliefs, fears, hopes, and desires are intentional; but there are forms of nervousness, elation and undirected anxiety that are not intention”. Thus intentionality is not the same as consciousness because one’s feeling of a certain happiness or elation may not have any cause and so, that a person may not be able to side the intentional different of his or her happiness or elation. For example, if I have a fear or desire, it must be a desire fear of something.

Searle thus argues that conscious state, in general are intentional in character. This intentionality, already professor Ranjan panda has explained in his lectures and I will be explaining this intention in respect to creativity and consciousness. The intentionality of mental states relates the intentional state with state of affairs in the world. According to Searle, intentional state is different to objects and state of affairs, in the sense of represent that speech act represent objects and state of affairs. According to him, just ask there is a distinction between the propositional content and illocutionary force? In speech act and in the same way in the case of intentionality, there is a distinction between the representational content and the psychological mode, as we have already discussed that the instrumentalists reduce intentionality to mechanical processes.

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According to instrumentalists, we can attribute intentionality to a mechanical system since the machine can have an intentional stance. As Dennett point outs, “the definition of intentional systems I have given does not say that intentional systems really have

beliefs and desires, but that one can explain and predict their behavior by ascribing beliefs and desires to them”.

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Against this, however, Searle has argued that intentionality cannot be reduced to the causal processes in the brain, since it is a part of consciousness. Intentional mental phenomena are part of our natural biological life history.

As Searle puts it, “Intentional phenomena, like other biological phenomena, are real intrinsic features of certain biological organisms, in the same way that mitosis, meiosis, and the secretion of bile are real intrinsic features of certain biological organism.”

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Again Searle has argued that intentionality cannot be reduced to the causal processes in the brain, since it is a part of consciousness. Intentional mental phenomena are part of our natural biological life history. As Searle puts it, “Intentional phenomena, like other biological phenomena, are really intrinsic features of certain biological organisms, in the same way that mitosis, meiosis, and the secretion of bile are real intrinsic features of certain biological organism”, which we have already explained some of lectures.


For Searle, human beings have certain intrinsic intentional states, which are caused by processes in the nervous systems of this organism and they are realized in the structure of this nervous system. He advocates that what is called biological naturalism? According to which mind is really real in the natural world. This entails a formulae property dualism in the Cartesian traditions which accept mind as an emergent property of the natural order.

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Like Searle, Chalmers has also argued that no reductive explanation of consciousness is possible because consciousness logically does not supervene on the physical facts.

According to him, consciousness is 'naturally supervenient' but not 'logical supervenient' on the physical facts.



Like John Searle, David Chalmers also has explained, argued that no reductive explanation of consciousness is possible because consciousness logically does not supervene on the physical facts. According to him, a consciousness is 'naturally supervenient' but not 'logically supervenient' on the physical facts.


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His argument is that consciousness different from all other properties, including biological properties such as life. For example, in the case of a zombie, though there are physical features of a human organism, yet it lacks consciousness.

According to Chalmers, "the logical possibility of zombie seems equally obvious to me. A zombie is just something physical identical to me but which has no conscious experience—all is dark inside."

Chalmers, David J., *The Conscious Mind*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996.




His argument is that consciousness different from all other properties, including biological properties such as life. For example, in the case of zombie, though there are physical features of a human organism, yet it lacks consciousness. According to

Chalmers, the logical possibility of zombie seems equally obvious to me. A zombie is just something a physical identical to me but which has no conscious experience-all is dark inside”. The physical identity between a zombie and a human being does not entail the zombie being conscious. Thus we have to accept that there is an exponential gap between physical processes and mental processes which will explore in the next sections.

According to strong artificial intelligence, the machines like computers have intelligence though they have no consciousness. But

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
the question is: Do computers have intelligence? In a derivative sense, but that does not make them have conscious intentional experience. This raises possibility that intelligence, cognitions, and information processing do not require consciousness. If machines are not conscious, it does not mean that human beings are not conscious. It is consciousness, which makes that distinction between mind and machines, and again it is consciousness, which accounts for the first-person or subjective experience.

Machines lack consciousness or they are designed to function mechanically. It is important to discuss the relationship between consciousness and prevail in this connection. It is not easy to prove that the one is impossible without the other, but it is certain that we cannot prove that the robot is conscious and that it has a prevail. We have complete causal explanation of all its behavior and this explanation does not at any stage

depend on its consciousness and so, its behavior cannot be a proof of position of consciousness.

Consciousness is not a property that can be detected in a machine by any physical examinations, because it cannot be identified with any physical characteristics. But a conscious robot is just an assemblage of more elemental artifact, silicon chips, etcetera. Therefore, it has no element of consciousness and prevail in it. Machine consciousness is thus impossible and which needs no elaborate demonstrations.


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Machines or robots are purely material things, and consciousness requires immaterial mind-stuff. And mental states and events are a product of the operation of the brain, but the program is not in that way a product of the computer.



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
A machine is inorganic, and consciousness can exist only in an organic brain. It is not that consciousness is necessary to explain certain behavior in machines. Although one may feel that consciousness can go along with actions of the machines, it does not follow from it, that, in fact, consciousness accompanies them. Machines that seem to use the word 'conscious' correctly, do so simply because they are programmed in a certain way. Machines remain lifeless and inert devices, even if they are manipulated intelligently by the human designers.

The robot is simply a machine which is essentially distinct from the human, its behavior aspects. Therefore, humans, and not robots are conscious. It is true that a robot can be can do many things which human beings do. Another important fact regarding machine is that machines or robots can do more work than human beings, even then a robot has no consciousness, no prevail, and no mind. It is really official to talk of a stone or a stop watch whatever it is conscious, because it is obscure of as its being dead, asleep, drug or unconsciousness.

However, there are case, where it is very difficult to decide the question of consciousness; that is bacteria, jelly fish, etcetera, which are unlike stones, stop watches, and the computers. In these cases, it is difficult to say whether these organisms are minds like ours, as you know some qualities that belong to human minds do not belong to any other organism. In contrast to this; however, idea of a conscious machine is a


contradiction in terms because the word 'consciousness' stand for something natural and the word 'machines' stand for something artificial. It is auction to say that machines are conscious. Thus the idea of machine consciousness and creative is at least derivative concept and at word self contradictory notion.

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
Now we have to see that how machine intelligence and consciousness fails in explaining consciousness and creativity.

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As we have seen already that the way artificial intelligence explained the concept of creativity and consciousness is very mechanical and artificial. It explained consciousness in terms of computational functions of the brain and so it fails to account for the creative feature of consciousness. As we have already argued that creativity is one of the essential features of the consciousness because artificial intelligence removes explanatory gap between mind and body. Because according to it, there is no distinction between mind and between the mental activity that mechanical functions of the brain.

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


Now, we have to see, “The ‘Hard’ Problem of Consciousness”, which is very interesting. The hard problem of consciousness, as the Chalmers has shown, is the problem of experience, especially to first-person perspective character which cannot be explained within a scientific framework.

Cognitive science can explain a systems function in terms of its internal mechanism. But it is not possible to explain what it is to have subjective experiences, because it is not a problem about the performance of functions. In recent times, all sort of phenomena have **eluded** scientific explanation. But consciousness has stubbornly registered this explanation. Many philosophers and scientists have tried to explain it. What the explanations are lower seems to **pal** of the target? Now the question is: What is it so difficult to explain according to Chalmers? Cognitive science has explained why there is conscious experience at all. We think and perceive there is a fair of information

processing, but there are also subjective individual aspect of consciousness which go beyond information processing.

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
Chalmers writes that “When it comes to conscious experience, this sort of explanation fails. What makes the hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond the problems about the performance of the functions. To see this, not that even when we explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions, in the vicinity of experience - perceptual discriminations, categorizations, internal access, verbal report- there may still remain a further question: Why the performance of these functions accompanied by experience?

According to him, even if all the functions of a system are well articulated, there is further questions as do, why there is any experience at all accompanying their functions? Cognitive science fails to explain why there is any experience at all, even though it explains all the brain functions. According to Chalmers, the hard problem of consciousness consists in the why questions regarding consciousness. But the question is: why is the hard problem is hard and why are the easy problem is so easy?

According to Chalmers, the easy problems are easy because this concerns the explanation of cognitive at abilities and functions. To explain a cognitive function, we need a mechanism that can perform the functions. The cognitive science offers, this type

of explanation and so or well suited to the easy problem of consciousness which you can see this now.

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On the other hand, through the 'hard' problem is 'hard', because it is not a problem about the performance of functions. The problem persists even when the performance of all the relevant functions are explained. Machine intelligence has not solved the hard problem of consciousness because as we have seen. It is has explained consciousness only in terms of easy problem of consciousness. Easy problems are all concerned with how a cognitive or behavioral function is performed. These are questions about how the brain carries out the cognitive task that is how it discriminates, stimulus, intimates information and so on.

Whereas the hard problem of consciousness goes beyond the problems of about how functions are performed. If artificial intelligence tries to give a definite definition of consciousness then it leaves out the explanatory gap, that is to say, it discusses the distinction between mind and body. If this is so, then it leaves out subjective experience, and opts for there will be only a third-person perspective of consciousness and if that is a third-person perspective of consciousness then machine, a consciousness is possible.


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## The Explanatory Gap and Subjectivity

What follows from Descartes's view is that consciousness is essentially a first-person, subjective phenomena, and conscious states cannot be reduced or eliminated into third-person.

Therefore, it is consciousness, which makes the explanatory gap between the first person and third-person perspective.

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Now, we have to see, “The Explanatory Gap and Subjectivity”, which is one, the important aspects of human creativity and human consciousness. Consciousness makes the mind body problem really intractable. The reductionist denied that there is a mind body problem at all. For them, there is no explanatory gap between mind and body, because there is no distinction between mind and body. Mind can be explained in terms of body and that is nothing called the mind. Since the mind itself is a part of the body. Therefore, for them, the mind is a reductively explainable in terms of body. On the other hand, many philosophers hold that mental states are not reducible to any physical states; that is the mental states are not reductively explainable.

Chalmers argues that no reductive explanation of consciousness can succeed because there is subjective quality of experience. Therefore, he argues that these quality of consciousness makes it different from all other properties, including emergent biological properties such as life and these things, I have already explained in the few lectures. The essence of body is special extensions and the essence of mind is thought. Though it takes to be to defining attributes of mind which in an incorporeal substance, a substance that is non-spatial in nature. What follows from Descartes's view is that consciousness is essentially a first-person, subjective phenomena, and conscious states cannot be reduced or eliminated into third-person perspective.

Therefore, it is consciousness, which makes the explanatory gap between the first-person and third-person perspective. And according to Cartesian conceptions, we have access to the contents of our own mind in a way denied as in this respective matter. There is something so special about our own knowledge of our own minds that naturally goes with the Cartesian view.

Pradhan argues that the mental life with its qualia cannot be nomologically determined by the physical conditions of the **inners**. The following has are the reason for the thesis that the mental life is independent of the physical body, though they coexist. First is the qualia of the mental life, mental states cannot be reduced to in a an artificial machines like the robot or machines, tables, they are unique of the person concerned. Secondly the qualia are the essence of consciousness and so must be increasing to the conscious subject. There is intrically gap between the qualia and the physical world remains or the qualia are understood widely as belonging to the conscious subject.


Consciousness, according to Nagel, makes the gap between mind and body and subjectivity is it is most troublesome features. Self is the subject which **encopresis** our feelings, thinking, and perceptions. The qualitative character of consciousness or experiences is what it is like is the subjectivity and subjective experience. As you have seen section, Subjectivity is cannot be explained reductively. It is not analyzable in terms of any explanatory systems of functional states or intentional states. Since they could be ascribed to robots or automata, they behave like people though they experienced nothing. There is a subjective feeling attached to our conscious experience because subjective feelings are the outcome of our conscious experience that is conscious in itself cannot be established, simply on the basis of what we observe about the brain and its physical effects. We can explain which property of the brain accounts for consciousness?

Distinct cognitive properties namely perceptions and introspections necessarily mediate our relationship with the brain and with consciousness. We cannot understand how the subject aspect of experience depends upon the brain that is really the problem. Consciousness, according to Searle, is essential subjectivity and this is not a mechanical state as many philosophers beliefs. Some of these are biological systems or consciousness and that consciousness is essential subjective. The term 'pain' is subjective as it is not ascribe to any observer because it is a first-person experience. The pain itself has a subjective mode of experience.

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As Searle puts it, “Conscious states exist only when they are experienced by some human or animal subject. In that sense, they are essentially subjective. I used to treat subjectivity and qualitativeness as distinct features, but it now seems to me that properly understood, qualitativeness implies subjectivity, because in order for there to be a qualitative feel to some event, there must be some subject that experiences the event. **No subjectivity, no experience.**”


 Searle, John R., *Consciousness and Language*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002.

John Searle puts it like this, he says that “Conscious states exist only when they are experienced by some human or animal subject. In that sense, they are essentially subjective. I used to treat subjectivity and qualitativeness as distinct features, but it now seems to me that properly understood, qualitativeness implies subjectivity, because in order for there to be a qualitative feel to some event, there must be some subjective that experiences the event. No subjectivity and no experiences”; that is to say that the qualitative experience can exist only as experienced by some subjects because conscious states are subjective

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Therefore, subjective conscious states have a first-person ontology because they exist only when they are experienced by a subject as self. It is ‘I’ who has experience and in this sense, it has the subjective existence. This gap between the self and the body not only establishes explanatory gap, but also gives the ontology of first-person.






in this sense, it is legitimate to hold that there is a first-person ontology as offer to the third-person ontology of mountains and molecules, which can exist even when there non-living creatures. Therefore subjective conscious states have a first-person ontology because they exist only when they are experienced by a subjective as self. It is 'I' who has experience and in this sense, it has the subjective existence. This gap between the self and the body not only establishes explanatory gap, but also gives the ontology of first-person perspective. Therefore, the subjectivity or 'I' is the central problem of the explanatory gap.

Cognitive science tries to explain, 'I' have conscious experience arise from the electrical processes of the brain. But it cannot show how and why conscious states belong to the subjective or 'I'. This qualitative feature of mental states brings the extends of qualia, which are the qualitative experience of the human mind, which I have already discussed about while I have discussing on qualia. But I would like to discuss here on qualia in relation to machine creativity and consciousness.


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## Qualia

As Chalmers writes, "a mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in the mental state. To put it in another way, we can say that a mental state is conscious if it has a qualitative feel—an associated quality of experience. These qualitative feels are also known as phenomenal qualities, or qualia for short."

 Chalmers, David J., *The Conscious Mind*, OUP, USA, 1997.

Now, let us see qualia in respect to consciousness and creativity. Qualia are the intrinsic quality of consciousness and conscious experiences. For example, the experience of tasting a sweet is very different from that of watching a movie because both of these have a different qualitative character of experience. These shows that there are different

qualitative features of conscious experiences. That is why we cannot derive the pleasure of eating sweets, by watching movies and vice-versa.

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But functionalist like Dennett have argued that


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Dennett have argued for eliminating qualia from the discourse of mind.


According to Dennett, “qualia are supposed to be properties of a subjects that are (1) ineffable, (2) intrinsic, (3) private, (4) directly or immediately appraisable in consciousness.”

Dennett, Daniel C., "Quining Qualia" in *The Nature Of Consciousness*, Ned Block Owen Flanagan, and Gulven Guzeldere (ed.), The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1998.

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he has been eliminating qualia from the discourse of mind. The basic reason is that the mind is a machine. It cannot entertain the so called qualitative subjective experiences called the qualia. We have to show how the mentality of the human mind cannot be represented in a mechanistic model and that are subjective mental states which need a first- person. According to Dennett, “qualia are supposed to be properties of subjects that are ineffable, intrinsic, directly or immediately appraisable in consciousness”.

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
**Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition**

- Qualia are ineffable because one cannot say exactly what way one is currently seeing, tasting, smelling, and so forth.
- Why qualia are ineffable is that they are intrinsic properties, which seems to imply inter alia that they are somehow atomic and unanalyzable.
- Since they are simple, there is nothing to get hold of when trying to describe such property.

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- Since qualia are ineffable and intrinsic, qualia are private because all interpersonal comparisons of these of appearing are systematically impossible.
- Lastly, since they are properties of experiences, qualia are directly accessible to the consciousness because qualia are properties of one's experiences with which one is immediately apprehensible in consciousness.


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properties of experiences, qualia are directly accessible to the consciousness because qualia are properties of one's experiences with which one is immediately apprehensible in consciousness.

Thus qualia constitute the phenomenal structure of the mind, in that they enrich our understanding of the mind and also provide clue to the ontology of the mental state. What the ultimately is has distinguish from the physical is to known from what the qualia rebuild about mind. Therefore, the qualia play a very vital role in the understanding of human mind and human creativity.


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Is Dennett right in calling qualia the private and ineffable experiences of a queer sort?


Pradhan argues, "the notion of privacy as we know from Wittgenstein's private language argument does not apply to the qualia in the sense that the qualia are intersubjectively intelligible and that they are available for inter-personal communication. The qualia of colour-perception are such that any two persons belonging to the same linguistic community can easily communicate their colour-experiences and can understand each other well. This shows that the qualia, in spite of being subjective, are not private at all. As to their effability or otherwise, it goes without saying that they are expressible in an interpersonal language; that is the reason why they are accessible to all speakers if they are suitably placed."

 Pradhan, R. C., "Why Qualia Cannot be Quined" in *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol- XIX, No-2, April-June, 2002.

The important question is that is Dennett right in calling qualia the private and ineffable experiences of a queer sort? Obviously not. "The notion of privacy as we have we know from Wittgenstein's private language argument does not apply to the qualia in the sense that the qualia are intersubjectively intelligible and that they are available for inter-personal communications. The qualia of color-perceptions are such that any two persons belonging to the same linguistic community can easily communicate their color-experiences and can understand each other well. This shows that the qualia, in spite of being subjective, are not private at all. As to their effability or otherwise, it goes without saying that they are expressible in an inter-personal languages; that is the reason why they are accessible to all speakers if they are suitable placed".


Thus Dennett's main argument that the qualia are inaccessible to all except to the subject of qualia does not hold good. Again Dennett's argument that qualia are atomic and non-relational is equal reason, for that the subjective experiences need not to be atomic at all because they can be taken as constituting the stream of consciousness in that way, they constitute a single unbroken series of conscious experiences. In this sense, the qualia are holistic rather than atomistic. The fact of the matter is that the qualia never exist in the isolation and that they are always in a constellation. For example, the color of experience of a red rose is not only that of the color red, but also that rose plant of certain shape and size. Here the two experiences do not stand apparent that constitute the whole.

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- Dennett is skeptical about the reality of the qualia because he believes qualia to be the private experiences and there is nothing in the mind that can correspond to these qualitative features of the mental states.
- Dennett argues against qualia, because for him, the brain functions as a machine.
- For Dennett, the mind turns out to be a computing machine programmed to cope with the cognitive representation of the world.

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
The Dennett is a skeptical about the reality of the qualia because he believes qualia to be the private experience and there is nothing in the mind that can correspond to these qualitative features of mental states. According to him, the qualitative features are the appearance of the brain state which in really are the functional state of the brain.

Dennett argues against qualia, because for him, the brain functions as a machine. The brain performs multiple functions that is to say that all varieties of thoughts, all mental activities are accomplished in the brain by parallel multi-term process of interpretations and elaborations. Since the input that is to say that that is why this model of mind is called multiple draft model of mind. This model, which I have already explained in the some of the lectures while I was explaining the artificial model of mind, I am not going

to repeat all these things. But Dennett has been argued that possibilities of machines consciousness and machine creativity. But in order to show that the impossibility of machine consciousness and machine creativity, we have to argue against Dennett view on mechanistic model of mind.

The nature of mind under this model is unfolded in cognitive process, which the mind undertakes. But Dennett, the mind it turns out to be a computing machines programmed to cope with the cognitive representation of the world. For machine function, it like him the structure of the mind is the structure of the machine consciousness.


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**Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition**

Now the question is: Can the qualia be made a part of the third-person perspective?

Dennett's reductionist program is fully committed to the reducibility of the qualia to the brain-state. However, this can be opposed on the ground that the qualia are ascribed to a conscious subject and not to the brain because the brain is a physical system though with infinite physical capacity. The subject is not reducible to the brain in the sense that brain itself belongs to the subject.

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Therefore, in this respect there is no place for the subject qualia among the mechanical state of the mind. Now, the question is: Can the qualia be made a part of the third-person perspective? Dennett's reductionist program is fully committed to the reducibility of the qualia to the brain- state. However, this can be opposed on the ground that the qualia are ascribed to a conscious subject and not to the brain because the brain is a physical state though with infinite physical capacity. The subject is not reducible to the brain in the sense that brain itself belongs to the subject or conscious mental states have different conscious experiences.

For example, a man can see something as red today, but tomorrow he may see the same as green. That is the thing remaining same as man's color-experiences can vary from seeing red to seeing green. In this case, the person's color-experience undergoes an

illusion, in the sense that he sees something different from what he would see earlier. Here the man is not misidentifying the same object, rather he systematically goes on describing his previous experience of red as that of green now. Therefore, we cannot deny the logical possibility of our qualia being inverted in the sense of one self and of other.


The qualia inversion does not entail the physical and the machine functionalist notion of consciousness because qualia inversion would not be possible, if the conscious state would have been functional state of the brain. The qualia inversion cannot be ascribed to the physical and the machine states. Therefore, the functionalist approach to consciousness must be rejected on the ground that conscious states are not physical states because conscious states have qualia.

Shoemaker is one of the profounder of on this inverter qualia and he says that inverter spectrum, there should be a systematic difference between the character of someone's color experience and a certain time and the character of that same person's colour experience at another time. But it is considerable that the two people have similar functioning visual system, but only the thing looks red to one person while they look green to the other.

In this spectrum inversion, way things look is possible, but that cannot be given a functional description, because person's mental life cannot be explained in mechanical terms. As you mentioned earlier, there is a first-person dimensions of the conscious states in that only for the first person point of view, we can understand the conscious state. The first-person point of view is such that it takes the mental state as belonging to a person's from his or her subjective point of view. In this connection, we can mention sorts of view, the first-person perspective provides an ontological state to the subjective mental state.

Mental states are subjective not in the epistemological sense of being known exclusively by the subject, but in the ontological sense that their essentially rebuild only to subject. The mental life of man cannot be fully represented in a mechanistic system and there are subjective mental states, which need a first-person prospective of their proper understanding.


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**Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition**

Functionalism is incompatible with our semantic externalism because functional organism is not simply a matter of 'sensory inputs', transition from one state to another, and 'motor outputs'.

Semantic externalism refers to the content of our words and thoughts, which is partly determined by our relation with things in environment.

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Functionalism is incompatible with our semantic externalism because functional organism is not simply a matter of 'sensory inputs', transition from one state to another, and 'motor outputs'. Semantic externalism refers to the content of our words and thoughts, which is partly determined by our relation with things in environment.

And therefore, a robot which has a program encoded in to its system does not have any relation to the external environment and this kind of limitations is existing not only to machine functions, but also to during machines. Therefore, functionalism is wrong in holding the thesis that proposition attitude is just like a computational state of for the brain. For example, to believe that there is a cat on the mat is not the same thing that there is a physical state or a computational state believing that there is a cat on the mat.

Then the question is: whether the semantic and proposition attitudes **proposition attitudes**, properties, and relations are reducible to physical computations, properties, and relation? This is impossible because propositional attitudes refers to the intentional state is that is to say that that it refers to various states of affairs in the world. If I say that I am doing some kind of activities, and I will be planning to doing some kind of activities and in that sense, I have many kind of my intentional states and that intentional state cannot be reducible.


Therefore functionality is wrong in the saying that semantic and proposition attitudes predicates are semantically reducible to computational predicates. There is no reason



why the study of cognition requires that we try to reduce cognition either to computations or to the brain processes. We may avail succeeding in discovering theoretical models of the brain which mostly increase our understanding of how do brain works, but if we will reduce the human mind into brain, in no way helps us understanding the mind.

Therefore, functionalism pairs accounts for the real nature of mental state because of unsuccessful atoms to reduce mental state with the mechanical state. It fails as a theory of mind because fails in a reductionist trauma and it explains in the meaningless way of about the human mind and therefore

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fails the mind in explaining in the non-computational way. Therefore, if it is fails, then it cannot explain the consciousness and creativity and even if it explain the consciousness and creativity. Epistemologically, the subject of consciousness is intimately knows the raw feelings.

Metaphysically speaking or the raw feelings things are real part of the mental world. Logically there is you can think of something, there is an artificial machines and which has artificial consciousness and artificial creativity. But metaphysical, it is impossible necessarily it is impossible. Therefore, mechanistic approach of mind is not possible to explain a consciousness and creativity. This is all about creativity machine verses human or human versus machines. Thank you.