

Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind And Cognition

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
Lecture No. # 38

Cartesian Theory of Mind Revisited

Today I am going to discuss about the Cartesian theory of mind, the Cartesian theory of mind revisited. Descartes, as we know, Descartes is one of the important philosophers in the philosophy of mind, without Descartes philosophy of mind, it is very difficult to explain the contemporary issues in philosophy of mind and cognitions. My colleague professor Ranjan Panda has explained on the Cartesian dualism, but I will be explaining something different from what professor panda has explained.

In these sections, I will be giving much importance on the Cartesian concept of mind and how the Cartesian concept of mind is an important.


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
- Descartes is one of the classical founders of non-computational theories of mind.
- Without a proper understanding of Descartes's view on mind, it is impossible to discuss contemporary philosophy of mind.

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
Because, Descartes is one of the classical founders of non-computational theory of mind. According to him, because the thought plays vital role in the case of mind, because the essence of mind is thought and the essence of the body is extensions and we cannot attribute essence of thought in a body because it is opposing each other. **there and** There are strong distinction between mind and body according to Rene Descartes. But Descartes is not denying the existence of body, rather than he is accepting the existence body, but he is saying that mind is different from the body. The way he is explaining mind which is completely non-computational and non-mathematical even if non-mechanical. Without a proper understanding of Descartes's view of on the mind, it is impossible to discuss contemporary philosophy of mind.

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In these sections, I will be explaining two important things namely the existence of mind and its nature, and how Descartes's idea of mind is non-computational.


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In the first section, I shall argue that Williams, Hintikka, Malclom, and many others philosophers philosophical arguments will not cope with Descartes notions of mind. Because the way they are defining the notion of a mind is neglecting the existence of mind and also its nature. Secondly, I shall argue that Descartes idea of mind is non-computational because the way Ryle, Quine, and other functionalists or founder of

cognitive scientists defined it is completely mechanical or behavioural and to which the notion of computationally is applicable, and the mental qualities are credible to machines. This section is to clarify Descartes's notion of mind from subjective point of view. I believe that Descartes's notion of mind cannot be explained or characterized in a computationalistic approaches, that are the subjective mental states, which we can see for from the first-person prospective of their proper understanding. Let us see the Cartesian mind and its nature.


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Cartesian Mind and Its Nature

- To know something implies that there is a mind, i.e., the existence of a knowing subject means that there is a mind.
- He tries to find out through his *cogito* argument that there is at least one knowing subject, i.e., his own self.

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According to Descartes, to know something implies that there is a mind. The existence of a knowing subject means that there is a mind again. He tries to find out through his cogito argument that there is at least one knowing subject that is his own self. He arrives at this truth through his method of doubt. The method leads Descartes to argue that the whole body of knowledge might be mistaken.

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Descartes' words,
"I will suppose then, that everything I see is spurious. I will believe that my memory tells me lies, and that none of the things that it reports ever happened. I have no sense. Body, shape, extension, movement and place are chimeras."

Descartes, Rene, *The Philosophical Writing of Descartes*, Vol. II, John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dougald Murdoch (ed. and trans.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984.



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In Descartes's words, I quote, "I will suppose then, that everything I see is spurious. I will believe that my memory tells me lies, and that none of the things that it reports ever happened. I have no sense. Body, shape, extension, movement and place are chimeras". In this context, Descartes raises fundamental questions from the possible non-existence of the external world and our own bodies. Thus it not follows that it is possible that we are ourself do not exist. Again he replied to above question is as follows:

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Descartes' word,
"No: if I conceived myself of something then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case, I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, *I am, I exist*, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind."


Descartes, Rene, *The Philosophical Writing of Descartes*, Vol. II, John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dougald Murdoch (ed. and trans.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984.



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
I quote “No: if I conceived myself of something then I certainly existed. But there is deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case, I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind”.

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Thus to think that one does not exist, one must exist. Therefore, one's own non-existence is **un** inconceivable. If I deny my own existence, the denying itself presupposes my own existence. For Descartes,

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
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- '*Cogito ergo sum*' is an indubitable proposition.
- Doubting one's own existence presupposes one's existence.
- Now the question arises:
 - (a) What is the nature of the statement '*cogito ergo sum*'?
 - (b) Is it a syllogistic inference like, 'whatever thinks exists; I think; therefore, I exist'?


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'Cogito ergo sum' is an indubitable proposition. Doubting one's own existence presupposes one's existence. Now the question arises: What is the nature of the statement 'cogito ergo sum'? Is it a syllogistic inference like, 'whatever thinks exists; I think; therefore, I exist'?

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- Descartes says, it is not a syllogistic inference; it is rather a self-evident truth known "by a simple intuition of the mind."
- The scholars are divided among themselves as to the exact nature of the transition from '*cogito*' to '*sum*'.


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For Descartes, it is not a syllogistic inference; it is rather a self-evident truth known "by a simple intuition of the mind". Thus scholars are divided among **them** themselves as to the exact nature of the transitions from 'cogito' to 'sum'.

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Bernard Williams has shown, there is something unique about the '*cogito*' which cannot be replaced by any other verb, for instance, '*ambulo*'. '*Ambulo ergo sum*' is not as self evident as '*cogito ergo sum*'.

Ambulo ergo sum
I walk, therefore I exists

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Williams has shown, there is something unique about 'cogito' which cannot be replaced by any other verb, from instance, 'ambulo'. 'Ambulo ergo sum' is not as self evident as 'cogito ergo sum'. Moreover,


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Hintikka argues that *cogito ergo sum* is not an inference but a performance.

For him, the relation of '*cogito*' to '*sum*' is similar to the relation of a process to its product.

The truth of 'I exist' cannot be revealed by any arbitrary human activity such as breathing, etc. but only by thinking. An attempt to think one's own non-existence amounts to persuading oneself to the belief that one does not exist.

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Unlike William Hintikka argues that cogito ergo sum is not an inference but a performance. He says the function of the word 'cogoto' in Descartes's dictum is to refer to the thought act through which the existence existential self verifiability of 'I exist' manifests itself. For him, the relation of 'cogito' to 'sum' is similar to the relation of a

process to its product. But truth of 'I exist' is revealed to one only when one actively thinks just as there is illumination only when there is source of light exist. The truth of 'I exist' cannot be revealed by any arbitrary human activity such as breathing, etcetera but only by thinking. An attempt to think one's own non-existence amounts to persuading oneself to the belief that one does not exist. Though each thought include the thought of one's own non-existence, the truth of sum is very fact. The self is come in to know its own existence and it is revealed in the act of thought.

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- For Descartes, the thought act is due to the thinking thing, which is the self.
- Thought, according to Descartes, is the essence of mind.
- Malcolm argues that in identifying thought as mind's essence Descartes employs the following principle: "X is my essence if it is the case that (a) if I am aware of X, then (necessarily) I am aware of myself and (b) if I am aware of myself then (necessarily) I am aware to X. thinking satisfies these conditions. Ergo, thinking is my essence."

Malcolm, Norman, "Descartes' Proof that His Essence is Thinking" In *Descartes: A Collection of Critical essays*, William Doney (ed.) Doubleday and Company, Inc., New York, 1967.

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According to Descartes, the thought act is due to the thinking thing, which is the self for him. Again the thinking or the self is that which, but what then I am I a thing that thinks, what is that a thing that doubt, understands, affirms, denies is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions. The existence of the thinking thing is the same as the existence of the knowing thing.

From this statement, it follows that there is a mind, which has the power of knowing something and if there exists at least one mind, it is logically and even if empirically possible that there are other minds. Now the question is: if there is **there is** or there are minds, what is the nature or essence? According to Ryle and Descartes, thought is the essence of the mind. The essence of a thing is defined as that which is necessarily for its existence and if it has a non-necessary relationship then we cannot accept it is existence.

Therefore, thought is the essence of mind. The similar way, extension is the essence of the body. Without extensions, we cannot imagine a body. If we imagine some kind of extended things is existing in this space and time, then we have to predict that something is existing. We cannot think that something is existing which has the properties of extensions, but it is not existing in the space which is one of the contradictory statements. Therefore Descartes claims that he has clear and distinct perceptions or awareness that is a thinking thing and nothing other than thought belongs to his nature.

But on the **on the** other hand, Malcolm argues that in identifying thought as mind's essence Descartes employs the following principles: "X is my essence if it is the case that (a) if I am aware of X, then (necessarily) I am aware of myself and (b) if I am aware of **I am aware of** myself then (necessarily) I am aware of aware to X, thinking satisfies these conditions. Ergo, thinking is my essence". Malcolm illustrates how thought along satisfy the single principle that any act of thought for Descartes is identical with the act of consciousness. Consequently, if I am aware of anything then I am thinking, and so if I am aware of thinking then I am thinking, and if I am thinking I am aware of thinking.

In Malcolm's view, though Descartes does not explicitly maintain that whatever I think. Therefore, I am aware of myself. He would be drawn to accept it partly because the base support for his principle, "I think ergo, I exist" is at the same time a support for the principle, "I think ergo, I am aware that I exist". So, thought satisfies the conditions (a) of the above principles. It also satisfies the condition (b) as they has every act of awareness of myself is also an act of my awareness of something other than myself. Since acts of thoughts are identified with acts of consciousness. It follows that cognitive acts are conscious acts.

So far as Descartes concept of mind is concerned, because Descartes mind is one of the important aspects of cognitive states and process is their phenomenology. Our perceptions, understanding, judgement, and many other mental faculties can be defined and explain only in relation to consciousness. According to Descartes, the mind is a thinking substance **in downed** with various faculties such as sensory perceptions, understanding, willing, etcetera. For him, it is one and the same mind which will understand and has sensory perceptions.

Moreover, Descartes grant that the mind is associative with body and mind provides metaphysical support with the body. These derived him to the examination of the nature of the body in its metaphysical aspects that is body in the most general sense of the term. The most general concept of mind attains through a clear and distinct perception of the intellect is that it is an extended substance, a continuum with three dimension of length, breadth, and height. As in the case of the mental substance, the extended substance through its known, through its acts or modes which, according to Descartes as shape, size, position, motion, rest, etcetera. Therefore, this shows that Descartes idea of mind is something non-computational. Let us see how the cartesian mind is non-computational.

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Descartes's Idea of Mind is Non-Computational


- In the Cartesian scheme of mind, there is no place for computability.
- The thought act is due to the subjective thinking thing, which is the self.
- This subjective thinking thing or the self is that which "doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions."

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Descartes, Rene, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, Vol. II, John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dougald Murdoch (ed. and trans.), 1984

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Till now we have discussed the cartesian mind and its nature. In the Cartesian scheme of mind, there is no place of for computability, because the thought act is due to the subjective thinking thing, which is the self again. This subjective thinking thing or the self is that which "doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling and also imagines and has sensory perceptions. The existence of the thinking thing is same as the existence of the subjective thinking thing,

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- All these subjective activities are non-computational because the subjective activity is not mechanical.
- The mental processes, for Descartes, are intentional and are the free acts of the thinking subject. Hence they cannot be mapped mechanically in an algorithmic system.
- Descartes concept of 'I think' presupposes subjective experience, because it is 'I' who experience the world.
- Descartes' notion of 'I' negates the notion of computability in the mind.
- The essence of mind is thought, and the acts of thoughts are identified with acts of consciousness.
- Therefore, it follows that cognitive acts are conscious acts, but not computational acts

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because it is the subject who thinks all these subjective activities are non-computational because the subjective activity is not mechanical. If it is a mechanical then we can defined it objectively. Therefore, cartesian mind is subjective mind and which we can able to explain from the first- person perspective. The mental processes, for Descartes, are intentional and are the free acts of the thinking subject. Hence they cannot be mapped mechanically in an algorithmic way or algorithmic system. Descartes concept of 'I think' presupposes subjective experience, because it is 'I' who experiences the world. Descartes notion of 'I' negates the notion of computability in the mind. The essence of mind is thought, and the acts of thoughts are identified with acts of consciousness. Therefore, it follows that cognitive acts are conscious acts, but not computational acts.

Thus for Descartes, one of the most important aspect of cognitive states and processes is their phenomenality, because our judgements, understanding, etcetera can be defined and explained in relation to the consciousness not in relation to computability. We can only find computability in machines and not in the mind, which will understand and judge.

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- Descartes' dictum, "I think, therefore, I am" not only establishes the existence of the self which thinks and acts but also its freedom from mechanistic laws, to which the human body is subject.
- When Descartes makes the distinction between mind and body, he did not say that the idea of the mind is that of a ghost, although he did say that the idea of body is that of a machine.

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Descartes' dictum, "I think, therefore, I am" not only establishes the existence of the self which thinks and acts but also its freedom from mechanistic laws, to which the human body is subject. Moreover, when Descartes makes the distinction between mind and body, he did not say that the idea of the mind is that of a ghost, rather than (()) or ascribing that there is a ghost in the mind, or there is a ghost in the machines, or there is a ghost in the body, although he did not say, but although Descartes did not say that the idea of the body is that of a machine.

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- Ryle in his book, *'The Concept of Mind'* says that Descartes's distinction between mind and body is a myth.
- Ryle argues, "I shall often speak of it, with deliberate abusiveness, as 'the dogma of the ghost in the machine'. I hope to prove that it is entirely false, and false not in detail but in principle."
- Again he says, Descartes's distinction between mind and body commits a category-mistake.


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Ryle in his book, 'The Concept Of Mind' says that Descartes's distinction between mind and body is a myth. He argues, "I shall often speak of it, with deliberate abusiveness, as 'the dogma of the ghost in the machine'. I hope to prove that it is entirely false, and false not in details, but in principles". According to Ryle, Descartes's distinction between mind and body commits a category-mistake, because Descartes is categorizing, dividing both mind and body and that division making one kind of categorical methods.


As Ryle said, my descriptive purpose is to show that a family of radical category-mistake is the source of the double life theory. The representation of a person as a ghost mysteriously encoded in a machine and which derives from this argument because as it is true that a person's thinking, feeling, and purpose of doing cannot be described **solely** in the idea of physics, chemistry, and physiology. Therefore, they must be described in computer counterpart idioms, as the human body is a complex organized unity. So, the human mind must be another complex organized unity. Though one made of a different sort of stuff and with a different sort of structure or again as the human body like any other parcel of matter is a field of causes and effects. So, the mind must be another field of causes and effects, though not evenly placed mechanical causes and mechanical effects.

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- Ryle's understanding of mind, mind becomes as much mechanical as the body and is therefore non-different from the body.
- Descartes's argument for the mind, which is distinct from body, needs to be understood as an argument for the logical possibility of their separate existence and not for the fact that they exist independent of each other.

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In Ryle's understanding of mind becomes as much mechanical as the body and is therefore non-different from the body; however, Descartes refuse the mechanistic reading

of mind as you have seen. Descartes is a dualist rather than a mentalist. Descartes argument for the mind which is distinct from body needs to be understood as an argument for the logical possibility of their separate existence and not for the fact that they exist independent of each other.


The separability argument is as follows: firstly, I know that everything which clearly and distinctively understand is capable of being created by God are so as to correspond exactly with my understanding of it. Hence the fact that I can clearly and distinctly understand and one thing apart from another is enough to make certain that two things are distinct, since they are capable of being separated at least by God according to Rene Descartes.

The question of what kind of power is required to bring about such as a person does not affect the judgement that the two things are distinct? Thus simply by knowing that 'I exist' and seeing at the same time that absolutely nothing else belongs to my nature or essence exactly that I am a thinking thing. I can empower correctly that my essence consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking thing. It is true that I may have or I may anticipate that I have certainly have a body that is very closely joined to me. But nevertheless on the one hand, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am simply think that non extended thing and on the other hand, I have a distinct idea of a body in so far as, this is simply and extended non-thinking thing. Accordingly it is certainly that I am really distinct from my body and can exist without it.

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- Descartes has already proved in the *Second Meditation* the existence of a thinking being who has a clear and distinct perception of mind as a thinking, non-extended thing.
- This is a proof of the non-mechanical mind which is different from the body and which is subject to mechanical laws.

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Descartes has already proved in the Second Meditation, the existence of a thinking being who has a clear and distinct perception of mind as a thinking, non-extended thing. This is a proof of the non-mechanical mind which is different from the body subject to mechanical laws.

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- Similarly, in the *Fifth Meditation*, he has shown, that he has a clear and distinct idea of a body as extended and a non-thinking substance. This is to suggest that the mechanically existing body is ontologically distinct from the non-computational mind.
- The above distinction between mind and body supposes that there is no 'ghost' in human body or 'ghost in the machine'.


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Similarly, in the Fifth Meditation, he has shown that he has a clear and distinct idea of a body as extended and a non-thinking substance. This is to suggest that the mechanically existing body is ontologically distinct from the non-computational mind. The above

distinction between mind and body supposes that there is no 'ghost' in the human body or 'ghost in the machine'.

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- Descartes did not admit the existence of ghost in the machine.
- Had Descartes admitted that there was a ghost in the human body, then the mind itself would become computational, and there would be no necessary distinction between mind and body?
- Because the ghost itself is a body. But Descartes admits the distinction between mind and body and this shows that the mind is non-computational. It is mind, which has the capacity of intelligence, and understanding.

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Descartes did not admit the existence of a ghost in the machines. Had Descartes admitted that there was a ghost in the human body, then the mind itself would become computational, and there would be no necessary distinction between mind and body? Because the ghost itself is a body. But Descartes admits the distinction between mind and body and this shows that the mind is non-computational. It is mind, which has the capacity of intelligence, and understanding.

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- The Cartesian way of understanding of the concept of intelligence is anti-physicalist and anti-behaviourist and hence is anti-computational.
- The human mind is beyond the sphere of computability, because the human mind has innate ideas, which are embedded as the innate dispositions of the human mind.
- These ideas are *a priori* in the human mind and are the basic in-born propensities.

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
The Cartesian way of understanding of the concept of intelligence is anti-physicalistic and anti-behaviouristic and hence is anti-computational. The human mind is beyond the sphere of computability, because the human mind has innate ideas, which are embedded as the innate dispositions of the human mind. These ideas are a priori in the human mind and are the basic in-born propensities. Descartes objects my understanding of what a thing is what thing, what truth is, what thought is, seems to derive simply from my own nature. But my hearing and noise as I do now are seeing the some of some or feeling the fire, comes from thing which are located outside me or show I have (()) just.

The above observation of Descartes shows that innate ideas are not produced in ours by senses. If the ideas are conveyed to ours by the senses like heat, sound, etc, we will not have to refer to anything outside ourselves, they too would be innate. For Descartes, the ideas of pain, colours, sounds, and the light must be all the more innate, if on the occasion of the certain corporeal motions. Our mind is to be capable of representing them itself or there is no similarity between these ideas and corporeal motions. Here it follows that there is a distinction between innate and adventures ideas and that innate ideas are universal ideas whereas, adventures ideas are particular ideas.

As Descartes points out that hearing a noise, seeing the scenes, and feeling the fire, are all particular ideas. Again it must noted that the procession of the particular is not


possible without the universal. Innate universal ideas are necessarily required for the cognition of the particular objects in the world.

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- Following Descartes, Chomsky established that language too is an innate faculty of the human species.
- Language becomes the essence that defines what it is to be human.
- Language is purely a syntactic system, according to Chomsky, and it therefore has a logical form which is universal and innate world.


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The following Descartes, Chomsky established that language too is an innate faculty of the human species. Language becomes the essence that defines what it is to be human. Language is purely a syntactic system, according to Chomsky and it therefore has a logical form which is universal and innate world.

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- Language must also have an essence; something that makes language what it is and inheres in all languages. That essence is called 'universal grammar'.
- Language does not arise from anything bodily. Studying the brain and body can give us no additional insight into language.


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Language must also have been an essence; something that makes language what it is and inheres in all languages. That essence is called 'universal grammar'. Language does not arise from anything bodily. Studying the brain and body can give us no additional insight into language. The basic tenets of Chomsky's linguistic are taken directly from Descartes. The only major tenet of Descartes and Chomsky rejects is the instance of the mental substance different from the human brain. Chomsky accepts that the human brain embodies the innate grammatical structure.

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Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

- Like Chomsky, Quine also affirms that there can be no philosophical study of mind outside psychology: progress in philosophical understanding of the mind is inseparable from progress in psychology.
- Quine opposes the Cartesian dualism and therefore arrives at a behaviourist and functionalist conception of mind.
- He reduces the mental states like beliefs and other propositional attitudes to functional states.
- If both Chomsky and Quine are right about the nature of mind, then Descartes's view of mind is wrong.

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Like Chomsky, Quine also affirms that there can be no philosophical study of mind outside psychology: progress in philosophical understanding of the mind is inseparable from progress in psychology, because psychology is a natural science studying a natural phenomena that is a physical human subject. Quine argued a dualism of mind and body is an idle redundancy. Quine posts that corresponding to every mental state; however, fitting or remotely intellectual, the dualist is down to admit the existence of a body state that obtains Quine and only Quine mental one obtains.


The bodily state is trivially specifiable in the dualist own terms is simply as the state of occupying a mind. That is the mental state, listed of ascribing the one state to the mind, then we may equivalently ascribe the other to the body. The mind goes by the bound and we will not be in list. Quine's position is that there are irreducible psychological properties, but all explanation is ultimately physical and his account of mental concept

emerges as he examines, how we acquire them and how we learn. He explains such terms are applied in the light of a publicly observable symptoms, bodily symptoms strictly of a bodily states and the mind is as may be.

Someone observes my joyful or anxious expression, or perhaps observes my gratifying, or threatening situation itself or hears mental about it. See, then applies the word joy, or anxious, or anxiety. After another such lessons are to find myself applying those who are to some of my subsequent states in the in case, where no outward signs have to be observed beyond my report itself. Without the outward sign, to begin with mentalistic terms, could not be learned at all.


Quine opposes the Cartesian dualism and therefore, arrives at a behaviourist and functionalistic concepts of mind. He reduces the mental states like beliefs and other propositional activities to functional states. If both Chomsky and Quine right about the nature of mind, then Descartes view of mind is wrong; that is if that human brain is the cause of the mental states then we cannot, but arrive at the conclusion that the mental states are causally computable within a physical system. Chomsky and Quine define the mental qualities in terms of physical qualities. Therefore, they define mind in terms of the computational functions of the brain. But in the case of Descartes's claim, but Descartes is claiming that all ideas in the mind are mental representational.

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- In the *third meditation*, Descartes gives an extensive account of ideas.
- He says, “thus when I will, or am afraid, or affirm, or deny, there is always a particular thing which I take as the subject of my thought, but my thought includes something more than the likeness of that thing. Some thoughts in this category are called volitions or emotions, which others are called judgments.”

 Descartes, Rene, *The Philosophical Writing of Descartes*, Vol. II, John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dougald Murdoch (ed. and trans.), 1984

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In the third meditation, Descartes gives an extensive account of ideas. He says that “thus when I will, or am afraid, or affirm, or deny, there is always a particular thing which I take as the subject of my thought, but my thought includes something more than the likeness of that thing. Some thoughts in this category are called volitions or emotions, which others are called judgments”. The above quotation shows that some thoughts are images of things. For example, they **retanant** things in the world that is they have an object or content by which they are individuated as an idea of this particular thing or being.


Descartes also considers an idea to refer to the form of any thought. Descartes said that I understand this term to mean the form of any given thought, the immediate perception of which makes me aware of the thought. Hence, whenever I express something in words and I understand what I am saying. This benefit makes it certain that there is within me an idea of what is signified by the what question.

The ideas for Descartes are those representational and intentional in character, because any ideas whatever we say, we express. It represents about the facts about the world which are mental as well as physical and in the terms of physical, when we actualize the things. Suppose I am feeling hungry and there is someone intentional activities to the concept of hungriness and when I get my food, when I satisfy my hungriness and here it is completely intentional and representational.

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- The ideas, for Descartes' are thus representational and intentional in character.
- Descartes, unlike Hobbes and Gassendi, is not a naturalist and keeps the thought content free from naturalization to which Hobbes and Gassendi are committed. For them, thoughts are mechanical processes in the brain.

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But Descartes, unlike Hobbes and Gassendi, is not a naturalist and keeps the thought content free from naturalization to which Hobbes and Gassendi are committed. For them, thoughts are mechanical processes in the brain. In reply to Gassendi, Descartes says that I realize none of things that the imagination enable me to grasp is at all relevant to this knowledge of myself which I possess and that the mind most there could be most carefully be diverted from such things, if it is to perceive its own nature as distinctly as possible and the contrary, Descartes hold that individual acts of machine is as much as they are experiences are relevant to grasping the nature of the mind. Because the mind is a thinking thing free from the mechanistic process of the brain.

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Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

- What separates Descartes' dualism from contemporary functionalism and identity theories is not so much his distinction between an immaterial mind and extended material body as his notion of the human being as a unity of mind and body, with the properties not reducible to either mind or body, but dependent precisely on their 'substantial' union.
- Descartes holds that thinking cannot be explained mechanically. His argument that brutes cannot think is equivalent to an argument that machines cannot think.

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
Descartes holds that thinking cannot be explained mechanically. His argument that brutes cannot think is equivalent to an argument that machines cannot think. He thinks that no machine could have the capacity of using the linguistic and other signs to express thoughts, the appropriate irresponsive to meaningful speech and the capacity of intelligently or rationally in all sort of situation. But what is shows special about him and

language in which about to what does it show that the Babier of any mechanism face to show.

A machine could be constructed to at are vast corresponding to bodily change in its origin. It could never use spoken wires or the signs composing them as we do to declare our thoughts to others because it is not considerable that the machines should produce different arrangements of words. So as to give an appropriately mechanical answer to whatever is said in its presence as the dualist for men can do.


Secondly, if though such machines might do something as well as we do them or perhaps it is better they would inevitable pale in others, which could revealed that they were acting not through understanding, but only from the disposition of their organs whereas, region is an universal instrument which can be used in all kind of situations. Their organs need some particular disposition for each particular actions. Hence, it is moral impossible to have enough different one's in a machine to make it act in all contingencies of like in the way in which our region make us at a

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- Descartes is drawing attention here is firstly, no machine could have the capacity to use linguistic and other signs to express thoughts and to give appropriate responses to meaningful speech, and secondly, machine could not have the capacity to act intelligently in all sorts of situation.
- The kind of automatic, rule governed computation or symbol processing that a Turing machine instantiates and that can be performed by electronic computers would not count as thinking in Descartes sense: nor would the mechanical operations of a computer or robot, no matter how ingenious or intelligent, count as rational behaviour as he understands it.

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
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Descartes is drawing attention here is that firstly, no machine could have the capacity to use linguistic and other signs to express thoughts and to give appropriate responses to meaningful speech. Secondly, machine could not have the capacity to act intelligently in all sorts of situations. Here and the moral communications have not afford in counter evidence to Descartes assumption because human language is based on an entirely

distinct to his field nor has modern linguistic dealt with his observation in various ways. For Chomsky, the main lesson to learn from the Cartesian tradition in linguistic are the ideas of an innate universal grammar and the ideas that are study of structure of this argument will reveal the structure of thought or mind. Descartes argument that brute or machine cannot think in the light of the genuine postings what makes an utterance very symbolic structure is meaningful.


The kind of automatic, rule governed computations or symbol processing that a Turing machine instantiates and that can be performed by electronic computers would not count as thinking in Descartes sense: nor would the mechanical operations of a computer or robot, no matter how ingenious or intelligent, count as rational behavior as he understands it. Not only is much a view of if thinking to narrow. It is based on the precise, the kind of category mistake that Ryle attributes to do Cartesians, which I have already discussed, but Descartes initials is not guilty of explaining thought in terms of extensions.

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Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

- Predawn clarifies that Descartes is not a reductionist as he feels that mind cannot be reduced to anything else and it must have an autonomous existence alongside the existence of the material body.
- The kind of automatic, rule-governed computation or symbol processing that a Turing machine instantiates and that can be performed by electronic computers would not count as thinking from the Cartesian point of view.
- Because Cartesian thinking is neither reducible to a narrowly understood rational capacity nor to consciousness.

 He clearly mentioned that consciousness is a necessary condition for thought.

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As Predawn clarifies that Descartes is not a reductionist as he feels that mind cannot be reduced to anything else and it must have an autonomous existence alongside the existence of the material body. Though I think of the mental reality does not deny its 'I exist' character in the world, rather it is an affirmation of it. In that sense, we cannot say that Descartes subjectivized the mental one and thus made in it into a private world. He

made a brief for to keep an **objectimic** constraints on the subjective mind and thus he explains that there is a mind and which is distinct from the mind and he has categorically attributes the essence of mind is thought, and the essence of body is extensions and this is because Cartesian **(())** of the mind and its inner experience does not assume that we know other minds as much as we know our own.

That is the reason why Descartes call the 'I think' the absolute basis of all our knowledge claims about all those and the also external one. Thus the self or the mind is irreducible not explainable in terms of the body or machines whenever mind or another another's. In view of this, we can say that the Cartesian philosophy of mind not based on a mistake and that it has shown the right way to understand of the mind.


Of course, Descartes would not have accepted the idea of mechanical or computational or artificial intelligence model of mind. He may still be considered and important for owner of cognitivist and computational view of mind because the essence of mind is rational thinking and that rational thought or cognition can be studied independently of the other phenomena like sensation and emotions that Descartes stated that body depends on mental phenomena to which mind is a positive consciousness.

Although, Descartes did not identify mental thought with consciousness emotions awareness, but regarded that all those conditions of thought while arguing the existence of mind, Descartes talk about that the mind acting in some particular location in the brain to contemporarily **trially** talk about mental processes as computational activity in the brain. But Descartes would not have accepted the mechanical application of rule on syntactic structure as a sufficient concern for a rational symbolic manipulation.

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Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

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The kind of automatic, the rule-governed computation or symbol processing that a Turing machine instantiates and that can be performed by electronic computers would not count thinking of the Cartesian point of view. Because thinking is neither a reducible nor understand in the mechanistic way and he has clearly mentioned that consciousness is a necessary condition for the thought and without consciousness is very difficult to explain thought and mind, and it is consciousness which is belongs to the self and it is because of that mind is different from them body and it gives one kind of metaphysical explanation on the mind not a metaphorical explanation on the mind. Cartesian mind is able to explain mind different from the body.

Thank you.