

Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind and Cognition

Prof. Ranjan K. Panda

Prof. Rajakishore Nath

Department of Humanities and Social Science

Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay

Lecture No. # 28

Phenomenal Consciousness – I


Today lectures, I am going to talk about Phenomenal Consciousness, qualia and quining qualia. The phenomenal consciousness plays vital role in philosophy of mind. The phenomenal consciousness is one of the most important aspects of explaining the concept of mind, because the phenomenal consciousness cannot be explained in terms of physicalistic or mechanistic way. Even if some philosophers and some scientist that trying to explain it, those explanations are not acceptable, why it is not acceptable and I will be discussing in this lectures. As we know that, conscious experience not only refers to the psychological concept of mind, but also refers to the phenomenal concept of mind, the phenomenal concept of mind as conscious experience, and of a mental state as a consciously experienced mental state. And the psychological concept of mind, as a causal or an explanatory basis of behavior, what according to the psychological concept of it, matters little whether a mental state has a conscious quality or not.

(Refer Slide Time: 01:43)

Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

The phenomenal concept of mind is the concept of mind as conscious experience, and of a mental state as a consciously experienced mental state.

The psychological concept of mind is the concept of mind as the causal or explanatory basis of behaviour.




Here, we find a fundamental distinction between both the conceptions.

(Refer Slide Time: 01:52)

Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

According to the phenomenal concept of mind, mind is characterized by the way it feels.

On the other hand, psychological concept of mind is characterized by what it does.




According to the phenomenal concept of mind, mind is characterized by the way it feels, and on the psychological concept of mind is characterized by what it does.

(Refer Slide Time: 02:05)

Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

For Chalmers, this distinction between psychological and phenomenal mind is absolutely necessary.

He remarks, "I will sometimes speak of the phenomenal and psychological 'aspects' of mind, and sometimes of the 'phenomenal mind' and the 'psychological mind'. At this early stage, I do not wish to beg any question about whether the phenomenal and the psychological will turn out to be the same thing."



Chalmers, David J., *The Conscious Mind*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996.


For Chalmers, this distinction between psychological and phenomenal mind is absolutely necessary. Here he remarks, I could, I will sometimes speak of the phenomenal and psychological aspect of mind, and sometimes of the phenomenal mind and the psychological mind. At this early stage, I do not wish to beg any question about whether the phenomenal and the psychological will turn out to be the same thing.

(Refer Slide Time: 02:43)

Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

According to Chalmers, every phenomenal state is a psychological state, in that it plays a significant role in the causation and explanation of behaviour, and every psychological state has an intimate relation to the phenomenal.


There is a conceptual distinction between the two notions; what it means for a state to be phenomenal is for it to feel a certain way, and what it means for a state, to be psychological is for it to play an appropriate causal role.



According to Chalmers, every phenomenal state is a psychological state, in that it plays a significant role in the causation and explanation of behaviour, and every psychological state has an intimate relation to the phenomenal concept of mind.

Accordingly, there is a **a** conceptual distinction between the two notions; what it means for a state to be phenomenal is for it to feel a certain way, and what it means for a state, to be psychological is for it to play an appropriate causal role, the distinction between the phenomenal and the psychological has a long history.

(Refer Slide Time: 03:36)




Here we can point out Descartes' concept of mind; Descartes is partly responsible for these, because Descartes held that every event in the mind is a *cogitatio*, or a content of experience. To this class, he assimilated (()) intentions and every type of thought, he assumed that every psychological, that is worthily of being called mental as a conscious aspect, that is whatever is a mental content is necessarily according to Descartes, a content of conscious experience.

Therefore, for him the notion of unconscious mental state is a **a** contradiction in terms. After Descartes, a new objective brand of psychological explanation was developed with no room for consciousness in its explanation. This mode of explanation had only partly success, what it established, the idea that psychological explanations can be proceed while ignoring the phenomenal.

But behaviorist differed in their theoretical positions, some recognized the existence of consciousness, found it irrelevant to psychological explanations, and some denied its existence all together, many went further denying the existence of any kind of mental state, behaviourist in general accepted that the mental states are irrelevant in the explanation of behaviour which could be carried out entirely in external terms. The move from behaviourism to computational cognitive science for the most preserved the idea that, there are no two intentional mental states, although the move brought back a role for internal states which could even be called mental state.


And there was nothing particularly phenomenal about then, these states where admissible precisely on the grounds of their role, in the explanation of behavior, the concept of mental, therefore was taken to be synonymous with psychological.

(Refer Slide Time: 06:04)




This explanation of phenomenal concept of leaves it unclear, why there is anything phenomenal at all. According to him, there is no great mystery about how a state might play a causal role, but what is truly mysterious is, why that state should feel like something, why it should have a phenomenal quality at all.

(Refer Slide Time: 06:33)




Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

Chalmers words,
“there is no great mystery about how a state might play some causal role, although there are certainly technical problems there for science. What is mysterious is why that state should feel like something; why it should have a phenomenal quality. Why the causal role is played and why the phenomenal quality is present are two entirely different questions. The functionalist analysis denies the distinctness of these questions, and therefore to be unsatisfactory.”

 Chalmers, David J., *The Conscious Mind*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996.

In Chalmers words, we can see, I could there is no great mystery about how a state might play some causal role, although there are certainly technical problems there for science. What is mysterious is why that state should feel like something; why it should have a phenomenal quality. Why the causal role is played and why the phenomenal quality is present are two entirely different questions. The functionalist analysis denies the distinction of these questions, and therefore to be unsatisfactory.


(Refer Slide Time: 07:11)



Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

The phenomenal concepts deal with the first-person aspects of mind, while psychological concepts deal with the third-person aspects.

The dualism between the phenomenal and the psychological is the fact that dualism between the first-person and the third-person perspectives of the mind.



The phenomenal concept deals with the first person aspect of mind, while psychological concept deals with the third-person concept of mind. The dualism between the phenomenal and the psychological is the fact that the dualism between the first-person and the third-person perspective of the mind.

(Refer Slide Time: 07:34)



Let us see the first-person and the third-person perspective of mind. The double aspects of mind or mental terms are psychological and phenomenal. The concept of pain provides a clear example; the term is often used to name a particular sort of unpleasant phenomenal quality.

On the other hand, there is also a psychological notion associated with the term, the concept of the sort of state that is causally connected with the damage to the organism, the relation of the organism and so on, both of these aspects are central to the common sense notion of pain.


The reason why phenomenal and psychological properties often run together is clear, it is because the relevant properties tend to co-occur, when the processes resulting from tissue damage leading to discomfort take place, some sort of phenomenal quality arises. That is, when psychological pain is presented, some sort of experience of pain is also present phenomenal. Chalmers says that, it is not a conceptual truth that the processes should be accompanied by the phenomenal quality, what it is a fact about the world. Once we have

this state of co-occurrence of properties in everyday situations, it is natural that our every day conception of things will bind them together.

From the above discussions, we find that many mental concepts lead a sort of double life. For example, perception can be taken as a psychological process involving cognitive response to the environment.

On the other hand, it may also be taken phenomenally, involving the conscious experience of what it is perceived, a Chalmers shows that some of these concepts lead more strongly towards the phenomenal and some lead towards the psychological.

(Refer Slide Time: 10:04)



Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

The concept of sensation, which is close to the concept of perception has both phenomenal and psychological components.

The phenomenal component is more prominent in 'sensation' than in 'perception'. Sensation is something like perception's phenomenal counterpart.

The questions are:

Can there be a mental concept which is psychological but not phenomenal?

Is it the case that the psychological and the phenomenal are factually co-occurrent, but are independent causally?

NIPTEIL

The concept of sensation, which is close to the concept of perception, has both phenomenal and psychological components. The phenomenal component is more prominent in sensation than in perception. Sensation is something like perception's phenomenal counterpart. Another questions are, can there be a mental concept which is psychological, but not phenomenal? That is an easy to the case that the psychological and the phenomenal are factually a co-occurrent, but are independent casually.


(Refer Slide Time: 10:44)

Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

Chalmers endorses the factual co-occurrence of the psychological and phenomenal but not their necessary relation.

It is evidenced in his analysis the propositional attitudes like beliefs, desire, etc. In the case of propositional attitudes the central feature of these mental states is their semantic content, or intentionality.

Phenomenal experience thus is not directly associated with a propositional attitude.

 NIPTEL

14

Chalmers endorse the factual co-occurrence of the psychological and phenomenal but not there necessary relation. It is evidenced in his analysis, the proposition attitudes like beliefs, desire, and etcetera. In the case of propositional attitudes, the central feature of these mental states is the semantic content, or intentionality. Phenomenal experience thus is not directly associated with a propositional attitude.


(Refer Slide Time: 11:39)

Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

Searle says,

“the intentional content of a belief depends entirely on the associated state of consciousness that the belief can bring about. Without consciousness, all that is present is ‘as if’ intentionality.”

Searle, John, "Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion and Cognitive Science", 1990.

 NIPTEL

15

However, a belief though psychological is still a state on conscious such that as Searle says, the intentional content of a belief depends entirely on the associated state of

consciousness that the belief can be, can bring about. Without consciousness, all that is present is as if intentionality. What Searle intends to say is that, the belief is always associated with consciousness, because unconscious machines have no beliefs, a conscious mind alone has the capacity of intentionality, about the world. Chalmers argues with Searle on the analysis of propositional attitudes.


(Refer Slide Time: 12:18)

Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

However, Chalmers has shown that all mental states have a psychological and a phenomenal aspect, and we need not legislate which is primary, although a strong case might be made for a psychological analysis.

There is no aspect of this state that outstrips both the psychological and the phenomenal. Thus, psychology and the phenomenology together constitute the central aspects of the mind.

In spite of togetherness between phenomenology and psychology, Chalmers holds that we cannot identify the phenomenal with the psychological.

 NIPTELL

Chalmers has shown that all mental states have a psychological and a phenomenal aspect, and we need not legitimate which is primary, although a strong case might be made for a psychological analysis.


There is no aspect of this state that outstrips both the psychological and the phenomenal. Thus, psychology and phenomenology together constitutes the centre aspect of the mind. In spite of togetherness between phenomenology and psychology, we cannot identify the phenomenal with the psychology, there are two distinct aspects of the mind, the phenomenal is picked out as the experience that tends to accompany psychological.

We can coherently imagine a situation in which the phenomenal quality occurs without the psychological properties. This distinction between the phenomenal and the psychological is source of the distinction between the easy and the hard aspect of the human mind.

Why it is easy, and why it is hard? It is easy, because it is a phenomenal consciousness, it is a conscious experience which cannot be explained in a functional terms; it is hard, because it cannot be explained in the phenomenal consciousness.

It is easy, because it can be explainable in the scientific way and if it is explanation in the scientific way, then it is an easy problem, the actual the problem of consciousness is one of the hard problems of consciousness according to David Chalmers.

(Refer Slide Time: 14:15)




Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

As we have seen mental terms are dual in nature. There are two concepts of consciousness, i.e., psychological consciousness and phenomenal consciousness.

It is clear that there is a phenomenal and a psychological property in the vicinity of each of these concepts.

The phenomenal and the psychological properties in the vicinity of these notions tend to occur together, but as with other mental concepts, they should not be conflated.

 NIPTEIL

Let us see the phenomenal consciousness. As we have seen mental terms are dual in nature. There are two concepts of consciousness, psychological consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. One may put forward an explanation of consciousness by emphasizing the phenomenal quality of consciousness, what will end by giving an explanation of some aspect of psychological consciousness, such as the ability to introspect, to think and to perceive etcetera. There are varieties of psychological consciousness such as awareness, introspections, self consciousness, attentions, voluntary conduct, knowledge and mainly other mental states.

These are holds that all largely functional (()) and this can be seen from a psychological perspective, although many of them are associated with the phenomenal state. It is clear that there is a phenomenal and a psychological property in the vicinity of each of these concepts. The phenomenal and the psychological properties in the vicinity of these notions tend to occur together, but as with other mental concept, they should not be

conflated. We should also be careful not to conflict the phenomenal sense of these terms with phenomenal consciousness in general.


(Refer Slide Time: 15:50)

Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

We may point out that the psychological perspective of consciousness can be analyzable in terms of phenomenal perspective, but phenomenal consciousness cannot be explained in terms of psychological perspective because of its irreducibility and non-computational nature.

The reductive explanation of consciousness is not possible because consciousness cannot be logically supervene on the physical.

This non-reductive aspect of consciousness is 'naturally supervenient', but not 'logically supervenient'.

 RIPTIL

We may point out that psychological perspective of consciousness can be analyzable in terms of phenomenal prospective, but phenomenal consciousness cannot be explained in terms of psychological perspective because of its irreducibility and non-computational nature or non mechanical nature. But Chalmers, the reductive explanation of consciousness is not possible because consciousness cannot be logically supervenient on the physical.


This non-reductive aspect of consciousness is naturally supervenient, but not logically supervenient. Chalmers writes that to make the case against reductive explanation, we need to show that consciousness is not logical supervenient on the physical.

In principle, we need to show that he does not supervene globally that is, that all the micro physical facts in the world do not entail the facts about consciousness. In practice it is easier to run the argument locally, argument that in an individual, micro physical facts in the world do not entail the facts about consciousness. When it comes to consciousness, local and global supervenes possibly stand and fall together.

So, it does not matter much which we run the argument, if consciousness supervenes at all. It almost shortenly supervenes locally; if this is disputed, however all the arguments

can be run at the global level with the straight forward alternations. This is because the phenomenal property of consciousness makes it different from all other properties.

(Refer Slide Time: 17:59)




Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

If phenomenal consciousness would have been logically supervenient on the physical body, then it would have been functionally identical with the latter. In that case, consciousness would be explained completely in terms of the physical properties.

Therefore, one cannot reduce facts about consciousness to physical facts and cannot explain the occurrence of consciousness.

Chalmers argues that there is little hope that a purely physicalist or materialist theory can explain consciousness at all, especially the phenomenal or qualitative aspects of consciousness.

 NIPTE

If phenomenal consciousness would have been logically supervenient on the physical body, then it would have been functionally identical with the latter. In that case, consciousness would be explained completely in terms of physical properties. As Chalmers argues, of course there is a sense in which the physics of the universe most entails the intense of consciousness.


If one defines physics as the fundamental science from whose facts and cause everything else follows, these construal of physics, however (()) the questions involved. If one allows physicist who include theory, they brought special to deal with the phenomena of consciousness, (()) motivated by more basic considerations, then we may get an explanation of consciousness.

But it will certainly not be a reductive one, for our purpose it is best to take physics to be the fundamental science developed to explain observations of the external world. If this kind of physics entails the facts about consciousness, without invoking consciousness itself in a crucial role, then consciousness would truly be reductively explained for the region, David Chalmers have given, there is a good reason to believe that no such (()) explanation is a possible.

Therefore, one cannot reduce facts about consciousness to physical facts and cannot explain the occurrence of consciousness.

Chalmers argues that there is a little hope that a purely physicalist or materialist theory can explain consciousness at all, especially the phenomenal or qualitative aspect of consciousness. We may say that our knowledge of consciousness comes from our experience and not from external observations. The existence of the external world is not enough for us to assume the intensity of conscious experience; it is only the first person experience of consciousness which poses the problem of non-computationality in consciousness. Therefore, it is the subjective character of experience which is not analyzable through any explanatory systems of functional state or human behaviour.

(Refer Slide Time: 21:05)




Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

If it is logically supervenient, there would be no such epistemic asymmetry, a logically supervenient can be detected straightforwardly and there is no special role for the first person case.

Chalmers shows that consciousness is a first-person phenomena and cannot be inferred or defined from the physicalistic point of view.


This is because there is 'gap' between physical level and level of conscious experience.

 NIPTELL

If it is logically supervenient, there would be no such epistemic asymmetry, a logically supervenient cannot be detected straight forwardly and there is no special role for the first persons, therefore it is subjective character of experience which is not analyzable through any explanatory system of functional states or human behaviour.

If it is logically supervenient on this, then there would be no such epistemic asymmetry, a logical supervenient can be detected straightforward and there is no special role for the first person case. Chalmers shows that consciousness is a first-person phenomena and cannot be inferred or defined from the physicalistic or mechanistic way. This is because there is gap between physical level and the level of a conscious experience.


(Refer Slide Time: 22:13)



Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

Consciousness cannot be explained reductively, but can be explained in its own terms. Because the conscious mental states as distinguished from the physical facts have a subjective aspect.


For example, the mental state of pain which is not the same as the state of the brain, since there is subjective experience of pain is not explainable in terms of the computational functions of the brain. Thus conscious experience cannot be reductively explained in terms of physical and functional laws of the brain.



Consciousness cannot be explained reductively, because it can be explain in its own terms, because the conscious mental states as distinguished from the physical facts have a subjective aspect.

For example, the mental state of pain which is not the same as the state of the brain, since there is subjective experience of pain is not explainable in terms of the computational functions of the brain. Thus conscious experience can be reductively explained in terms of physical and functional laws of the brain.


(Refer Slide Time: 22:55)



Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition


QUALIA

- The term 'qualia' means the qualitative character of experience.
- Every experience has a distinctive qualitative character. The subjective or qualitative feel of a conscious experience is characterized as something, which the organisms necessarily have in order to be conscious.
- Thus, qualia are the qualitative subjective experiences of mental states and the properties of conscious experience.



Now, we have to see the concept of qualia and the how qualia is explaining in the phenomenal consciousness because the conscious experience is nothing but the phenomenal qualia the term qualia means the qualitative character of experience every experience as a distinct qualitative character the subjective or qualitative field of a conscious experience is characterized as something which is organisms necessarily have in order to be conscious thus qualia are the qualitative subject be experience of mental state and the properties of conscious experience.

(Refer Slide Time: 23:36)



Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

The question is:

- Are these subjective experiences or qualia real?
- It is a controversial question among philosophers whether qualia are definable in functional terms and whether qualia are the physiological states of the brain.
- The most important argument is that qualia are the functional states of the brain and, thus, are real only as the physical states of the brain.
- Opposed to this is the argument that qualia are the qualitative feel of the conscious states and so are subjective in character.


Now, the question is, are these subjective experiences or qualia real? It is a controversial question among philosophers whether qualia are definable in functional terms and whether qualia are the psychological states of the brain.

The most important argument is that qualia are the functional states of the brain and, thus, are real only as the physical state of the brain. Opposed to this is the argument that qualia are the qualitative feel of the conscious states and so are subjective in character. Subjective qualia experiences thus have qualia inherent in them.

In other words, an experience is a conscious experience, if and only if that is some raw feel in which is subjective, qualia are experiential properties of sensations, feelings, perceptions, or the way it feel to have a pain, or the way it feels to see. According to Ned Block, the qualia, or qualia that include the ways it feels to see here, and smell the way it feels to have a pain, originally what it is like to have mental states.

Qualia are experimental properties of sensations, feelings, perceptions, and thought, and desire as well also.

(Refer Slide Time: 25:14)




Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

- The first-person experiences such as pain, colour sensation, the sensation of touch and smell, etc. are the qualitative experiences of mental states.
- These mental states are the common stuff of our mind.
- For example, in having the smell of flowers or the taste of ice cream, we have subjective experience of these things, but we cannot describe them because these experiences have a distinctive phenomenological character. Our color experiences are such that there is something like to have them with a phenomenological image. A quale is thus a mental state that has the property of being a phenomenal experience.

The first-person experiences such as pain, colour, sensation and the sensation of touch and smell, etcetera are the qualitative experiences of mental states. These mental states are the common staff of mind.


For example, in having the smell of flowers or the taste of ice cream, we have subjective experience of these things, but we cannot describe them, because these experiences have a distinctive phenomenological character. Our colour experiences are such that there is something likes to have them with a phenomenological image. A quale is thus a mental state that has the property of being a phenomenal experience.

(Refer Slide Time: 26:06)



Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

- Qualia constitute the essence of the conscious states.
- For example, the quale 'pain' is the feeling of pain rather than a mere bodily sensation. Thus, the qualia are the raw feels associated with the conscious states.

 NIPTEL


Qualia constitute the essence of the conscious states. For example, the quale pain is the feeling of a pain rather than a mere bodily sensation. Thus, the qualia are the raw feeling association with the conscious state. The type of conscious experience is something we cannot do without if we are to generate and test hypothesis about the links between the phenomenological and the psychological, the psychological and the neural.

The qualitative experiences like experiences of colour, smell, taste, pain, and etcetera can be explained in neuroscientific terms, these experiences play a causal role in the domain of mental state. The experience of pain for example, has the belief that, he is in pain and he acquires a desire to take step to recapitulate. When he is in pain, he is in a state that definitely has a range of causal or dispositional properties. However, in addition to the, to their functional role, the qualitative experience have a characteristic phenomenal feel called qualia.

(Refer Slide Time: 27:33)

Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

- Searle argues that every conscious state has a certain qualitative feel to it.
- For example, the experience of tasting beer is very different from hearing some music and from smelling a rose or watching movie, both of these have a different qualitative character. Hence, there are the different qualitative features of conscious experience.
- Thus, qualia constitute the essential properties of conscious experience. That is why, one cannot derive pleasure of drinking beer by listening to music, or the pleasure of witnessing sunset by smelling a rose.

 NIPTEL

Searle argues that every conscious state has a certain qualitative feel to it. For example, the conscious experience of tasting beer is very different from hearing some music and from smelling a rose or watching a movie; both of these have a different qualitative character.

Hence, there are the different qualitative features of conscious experiences. Thus, qualia constitute the essential properties of conscious experience. That is why, one cannot derive pleasure of drinking beer by listening to music, or the pleasure of witnessing sunset by smelling a rose.

That is a logical, not an empirical truth, and Chalmers characterize it as the subjective quality of experience. A mental state is conscious if there is something, it is like to be in that mental state. To put it another way, we can say that a mental state is conscious if it has a qualitative feel, or a qualitative experiences, these qualitative feels are also known as phenomenal qualities, or qualia for short.

The problem of explaining these phenomenal qualities is just the problem of explaining consciousness. According to Chalmers, phenomenally conscious states are not functional state, but can be realized through our experience like the experience of red, the phenomenal consciousness does not (()) metaphysically on lower level facts, that is to say, even though two functional states are isomorphic, they differ in phenomenal

consciousness, and experience or other mental entity is phenomenal conscious only when there is something to be like to be that state.

For example, perceptual experiences like testing, seeing, feeling, etcetera are cases of such experiences. The qualities (()) to us in conscious experience are the qualities which represent object in the world, thus qualia are considered as the qualitative characteristics of mental state which include perceptions, sensations, affections, desires, thought and beliefs. For a very conscious experiences or conscious mental state, there is something which is like for the subject to have it, or to be in it, they have a phenomenal feel or raw feeling.

Hence, problem of phenomenal consciousness is the problem of explaining how subjective feel is (()) in the brain. Phenomenal consciousness is a form of state consciousness, it is a property which some, but not other mental states (()). Specifically, it is a property which mental states have, when it is likes something to undergo then. And phenomenally, conscious states have distinct subjective feels and some would say, they have qualia, phenomenal conscious properties are experiential properties.

For example, we have phenomenal conscious states, what we see, hear, smell, taste and have pains, these properties are the experimental properties of sensations, feelings, and perceptions, and thoughts, etcetera. Thus, the phenomenal feature of the mind is characterized by what it is like for a subject to have that feature. Phenomenal experience is not nearly a succession of qualitative distinguished sensory ideas, but rather the organized cognitive experience of a world of objects, and of our self has subject within that world.

However, according to the functionalist, minds are complex arrangement of functional states, states that bear the right kinds of causal relation to one another and to inputs and outputs. A functionalist may therefore, assets that experiences themselves like qualities of their own, qualities indefinable independently of the qualities of object experienced or although, an experience may have qualities, these are not qualities we are in any sense our of in understanding the experience.

This subjective quality of experience or a quality we experiences is very difficult to get from the psychological aspect of mind. And these distinctions is very applicable to philosophy of mind, it is because there is a phenomenal and psychological distinctions.

The phenomenal consciousness is a kind of conscious experience or qualitative experience and that is called as qualia. And because of these qualia, it is very difficult to explain consciousness in mechanistic or functionalistic way. And some of these qualia, I will be explaining in the next lectures, thank you.